Being Rational
[quote]
The concept of rationality, one might say, is incorrigibly
elusive... I believe it is fair to say that in philosophical discussions
of rationality, there is a sense in which we do not "know what we are
talking about" and can never do so, if what is demanded is a concise
definition (Max Black).
[unquote]
If one assumes, as I do, that feelings of worthlessness are a
maladaptive byproduct of the evolution of rationality, then it seems to
follow that what Edward Stein has referred to as "the standard picture"
of rationality is probably mistaken -- that 'being rational' is not so
much a matter of slavishly conforming to established rules of inference
as a matter of 'being able to "see" what is going on' as a result of
"reasoning" (ampliative inference) that has already transpired, whether
one's own, or culturally acquired. Accordingly, I construe our
rationality ascriptions as *****sing a mental map of sorts -- one
comprised of both beliefs and values -- in which the cognitive component
of this map correlates with the extent to which it is comprised of
beliefs that accurately and coherently represent reality including,
among other things, beliefs about how to acquire beliefs that accurately
and coherently represent reality (reflected in how well one "reasons").
And, rather than a definition, I frequently find it helpful to visualize
a follow-the-dots diagram in which this cognitive component is
represented by the extent to which the lines have been connected
correctly and completely and in which cohering lines (coherent beliefs)
count for more than dispersed lines in terms of the ability to "see"
what the diagram represents.
Compatible with the foregoing and its implication that rationality is a
matter of degree, I also assume that when we refer to an individual as
"rational" or "irrational" that we are simply expressing a rough
appraisal of how this individual's mental map compares to the norm and
that the failure to appreciate this quirk in our ordinary use of words
has led to a certain amount of confusion. For this reason, I do not
perceive experimental evidence that humans routinely violate established
rules of inference (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky) as evidence that humans
are irrational, but rather as evidence that expert opinion might be
relatively more rational than the norm (in terms of 'being able to "see"
what is going on') where such matters are concerned.
[quote]
One of the slipperiest terms in the philosophical lexicon,
'rationality' is many things to many people (Alvin Plantinga).
[unquote]
PR
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