On Wed, 14 Nov 2007 03:50:18 -0800, knucmo <stevejouanny@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
wrote:
>On 9 Nov, 20:19, Scott H <zinites_p...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>> In response to determinism, Kant explains how the antinomy of free
>> will arises from a misuse of reason:
>>
>> "The possibility of an infinite origination, without a first member in
>> regard to which everything else is merely subsequent, cannot be made
>> comprehensible. But if you want to dismiss this puzzle of nature, then
>> you will find yourselves compelled to reject many basic synthetic
>> characteristics (basic forces) that you are just as little able to
>> comprehend, and even the possibility of a change as such must then
>> become objectionable to you."
>>
>> Up to here, I followed him. But then he says,
>>
>> "For if you did *not* find through experience that change is actual
>> [my emphasis on "not"], then you would never be able to excogitate a
>> priori how such an unceasing sequence of being and not-being is
>> possible."
>>
>> If instead of "for" he had written "however," I wouldn't have
>> considered it unsound writing. But then I would need a definition of
>> "change as such."
>>
>> I would have expected a proof by contradiction, i.e., "If you *did*
>> find through experience that change was actual, then..."
>
>Very interesting. In the 3rd antinomy, Kant assumes that pure reason
>always seeks the unconditioned in a series, and he uses this to
>sup****t causality via freedom. But I reckon reason only seeks the
>most recent, and sufficient cause. In other words, not every
>conditioned supposes a complete set of conditions which ends with the
>unconditioned.
You're conflating reason and understanding. I noticed you didn't say
"pure reason" seeks the most recent. Pure reason is not about finding
the most recent of anything, it is primarily concerned with God,
Freedom, and Immortality.
--
fantasybedtimehour.com
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