Re: Unusual line of reasoning in Kant's response to the antinomy of free will

On 9 Nov, 20:19, Scott H <zinites_p...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> In response to determinism, Kant explains how the antinomy of free
> will arises from a misuse of reason:
>
> "The possibility of an infinite origination, without a first member in
> regard to which everything else is merely subsequent, cannot be made
> comprehensible. But if you want to dismiss this puzzle of nature, then
> you will find yourselves compelled to reject many basic synthetic
> characteristics (basic forces) that you are just as little able to
> comprehend, and even the possibility of a change as such must then
> become objectionable to you."
>
> Up to here, I followed him. But then he says,
>
> "For if you did *not* find through experience that change is actual
> [my emphasis on "not"], then you would never be able to excogitate a
> priori how such an unceasing sequence of being and not-being is
> possible."
>
> If instead of "for" he had written "however," I wouldn't have
> considered it unsound writing. But then I would need a definition of
> "change as such."
>
> I would have expected a proof by contradiction, i.e., "If you *did*
> find through experience that change was actual, then..."

Very interesting.  In the 3rd antinomy, Kant assumes that pure reason
always seeks the unconditioned in a series, and he uses this to
sup****t causality via freedom.  But I reckon reason only seeks the
most recent, and sufficient cause.  In other words, not every
conditioned supposes a complete set of conditions which ends with the
unconditioned.