Re: Unusual line of reasoning in Kant's response to the antinomy of free will

On Nov 11, 7:57 am, Malrassic Park <male...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> On Sat, 10 Nov 2007 20:57:15 -0700, Malrassic Park <male...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> wrote:
>
> >You are equivocating over the term 'aware' by neglecting the analysis
> >of mind into faculties. We are only *intellectually* aware of some
> >things-in-themselves, but we have neither direct nor indirect
> >*sensory* awareness of free-will's spontaneous activity.
>
> I tried to scrunch too many ideas into one sentence there. We have
> indirect evidence of things-in-themselves. I'm saying that it is not
> like indirect evidence of atoms, because things-in-themselves are not
> possible objects of experience while Kant would consider atoms,
> theoretically at least, possible objects of experience given senses
> acute enough. So I'm trying to distinguish between possible and
> impossible objects of experience.
>
> --
> fantasybedtimehour.com

oh.