Re: Unusual line of reasoning in Kant's response to the antinomy of free will

On Sat, 10 Nov 2007 20:57:15 -0700, Malrassic Park <malenor@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
wrote:

>You are equivocating over the term 'aware' by neglecting the analysis
>of mind into faculties. We are only *intellectually* aware of some
>things-in-themselves, but we have neither direct nor indirect
>*sensory* awareness of free-will's spontaneous activity. 

I tried to scrunch too many ideas into one sentence there. We have
indirect evidence of things-in-themselves. I'm saying that it is not
like indirect evidence of atoms, because things-in-themselves are not
possible objects of experience while Kant would consider atoms,
theoretically at least, possible objects of experience given senses
acute enough. So I'm trying to distinguish between possible and
impossible objects of experience.


--
fantasybedtimehour.com