On Fri, 09 Nov 2007 20:11:06 -0800, Immortalist
<reanimater_2000@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>Kant faces a similar problem in his attempted resolution of the
>contradiction of the third antinomy (that either "there are in the
>world causes through freedom" or "that there is no freedom but all is
>nature.") (Prolegomena, 80) Kant holds that these statements are not
>really contradictory, and are only viewed as such due to a
>misunderstanding of what each statement is asserting. Kant resolves
>the contradiction by stating that "if natural necessity is referred
>merely to appearances and freedom to things in themselves, no
>contradiction arises if we at the same time admit both kinds of
>causality, however difficult or impossible it ma y be to make the
>latter kind conceivable." (Prolegomena, 84) But Kant is once again
>making an unjustified claim about the nature of things-in-themselves,
>for if freedom did exist only in the realm of things-in-themselves, we
>would not at all be aware of it., and if we are aware of freedom, then
>in must be present in the world of experience.
You are equivocating over the term 'aware' by neglecting the analysis
of mind into faculties. We are only *intellectually* aware of some
things-in-themselves, but we have neither direct nor indirect
*sensory* awareness of free-will's spontaneous activity.
For example, you are intellectually aware of the existence of human
rights. You may see them being put into practice, but obviously you
can't actually see human rights because they are merely intellectual
concepts. Kant is saying that 'freedom' is merely an intellectual
concept. What you are aware of, in your own analysis, are the effects
of free-will, just as we are aware of the effects of human rights.
These belong to the theory of practical ethics. If, however, they were
something you were sensibly aware of, they would neither be practical
nor ethical, but theoretical.
--
fantasybedtimehour.com
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