Re: Unusual line of reasoning in Kant's response to the antinomy of free will

On Sat, 10 Nov 2007 12:33:12 -0800, Scott H <zinites_page@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
wrote:

>On Nov 10, 1:38 pm, Malrassic Park <male...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>> Kant is elucidating the circularity involved in denying causality on
>> transcendent grounds.
>
>I thought we were talking about his refutation of the denial of free
>will?

I wasn't clear enough. Freedom vs. determinism is a question of
causality. The transcendent origin of all series is a spontaneous
First Cause. If one denies a transcendent first cause then much
necessary empirical knowledge is also denied. ("But if for this reason
you refuse to recognise this enigma in nature, you will find yourself
compelled to reject many fundamental synthetic properties and forces,
which as little admit of comprehension.") Free will, as spontaneity of
action, itself is a first cause of events within the world. Place your
big toe in a still pond and watch the ripples. But Kant is referring
to a First Cause from outside the world, the beginning of every chain
of events such as the source of the Big Bang. "Even if a
transcendental power of freedom be allowed, as supplying a beginning
of happenings in the world, this power would in any case have to be
outside the world." (op cit.) NKS says "transcendental," but a Freedom
to set the entire universe in motion would truly be transcendent,
because it is really "not a beginning in time, but in causality" (op
cit.), a transcendent versus an empirical cause.

Thus the scientific materialist should realize that in denying
spontaneity, simply because it is not scientifically understandable,
he is denying much empirical knowledge that allegedly stands on solid
grounds, but that is equally incapable of being understood.

--
fantasybedtimehour.com