On Sep 6, 11:14 pm, Michael Gordge <mikegor...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> On Sep 7, 1:19 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>
> > This thing-in-itself and things-
> > as-they-appear is a statement about the difference between appearance
> > and reality.
>
> Crap, it originates from Kant claiming, and in the very first
> paragraph of his Pure Unadulterated Destruction Of Reason (PUDOR) that
> even though, he claims, [sic].. "that ALL of man's knowledge begins
> with exprience of that there is no doubt", Kant then claims and in the
> same ****ing paragraph, except man's knowledge of time, which Kant
> claims, man's knowledge of time does not originate from objects
> awakening his senses and then the dopey git claims that all of man's
> knowledge begins with time.
>
> In one paragraph (as he does right throughout his PUDOR) he jumps from
> epistemology to metaphysics and thereby equates them with each other.
> In other words Kant gives time the same meaning as water, air and
> consciousness, ALL of which are required for man to have knowledge of
> ALL things.
>
> Michael Gordge
By means of outer sense, a property of our mind, we represent to
ourselves objects as outside us, and all without exception in space.
In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another are
determined or determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind
intuits itself or its inner state, yields indeed no intuition of the
soul itself as an object; but there is nevertheless a determinate form
[namely, time] in A23 which alone the intuition of inner states is
possible, and everything which belongs to inner determinations is
therefore represented in relations of time. Time cannot be outwardly
intuited, any more than space can be intuited as something in us.
What, then, are space and time? Are they real existences? Are they
only determinations or relations of things, yet such as would belong
to things even if they were not intuited? Or are space and time such
that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the
subjective constitution of our B38 mind, apart from which they could
not be ascribed to anything whatsoever? In order to obtain light upon
these questions, let us first give an exposition of the concept of
space. By exposition (expositio) I mean the clear, though not
necessarily exhaustive, representation of that which belongs to a
concept: the exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which
exhibits the concept as given a priori.
page 67
http://humanum.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/
If we remove from our empirical concept of a body, one by one, every
feature in it which is [merely] empirical, the colour, the hardness or
softness, the weight, even the impenetrability, there still remains
the space which the body (now entirely vanished) occupied, and this
cannot be removed. Again, if we remove from our empirical concept of
any object, cor****eal or incor****eal, all properties which experience
has taught us, we yet cannot take away that property through which the
object is thought as substance or as inhering in a substance (although
this concept of substance is more determinate than that of an object
in general). Owing, therefore, to the necessity with which this
concept of substance forces itself upon us, we have no option save to
admit that it has its seat in our faculty of a priori knowledge.
Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any
experience. For neither coexistence nor succession would ever come
within our perception, if the representation of time were not
presupposed as underlying them a priori. Only on the presupposition of
time can we represent to ourselves a number of things as existing at
one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times
(successively).
Time is a necessary representation that underlies all [A31/P075]
intuitions. We cannot, in respect of appearances in general, remove
time itself, though we can quite well think time as void of
appearances. Time is, therefore, given a priori. In it alone is
actuality of appearances possible at all. Appearances may, one and
all, vanish; but time (as the universal condition of their
possibility) cannot itself be removed.
Time itself does not alter, but only something which is in time. The
concept of time thus presupposes the perception of something existing
and of the succession of its determinations; that is to say, it
presupposes experience.
http://humanum.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/
http://www.bright.net/~jclarke/kant/index.html
http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html
http://www.4literature.net/Immanuel_Kant/Critique_of_Pure_Reason/
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/kant/reason/ch01.htm
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