On Mon, 13 Aug 2007 22:21:27 -0700, extropy1@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
>Wrong, Kant meant that a representation of a part of the world, inside
>the brain, is not identical to the world, presented to the brain via
>the senses. Again its like your saying a picture of something is the
>actual thing.
First, I'd like to invite you over to
humanities.philosophy.objectivism and post something similar to this
using Kant's example (from the Prolegomena) of the full moon appearing
larger on the horizon than it does at its zenith.
I don't know that Kant said the representation is not identical to the
world. I guess you are just trying to say that the thing-in-itself is
not the appearance.
Some question whether or not "representation" is best translated as
"presentation," and in fact the Pluhar edition of the CPR contains the
latter translation. That way you don't have to write 're-represent', I
suppose. The distinction is not that subtle. To re-represent, which is
really to re-present, is to display some mental content via
imagination. But we don't consider the re-presentation of an external
object (say, from memory) to be external.
A picture is not the actual thing, as you said, yet it has to reside
someplace. And this place is given by the forms, either in
imagination, or in sensibility alone as presentation (that content
which is given to the senses first).
>In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant'main goal was to find out what is
>certain and what is empirical. Your reading much more into it than his
>intent.
You're wasting your time arguing with Mr. Gouge, professional
Randroid.
--
Yes, we speak English!
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