"Neil W Rickert" <rickert+nn@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
news:7EhUk.6368$as4.1357@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> I'll begin my comments here.
>
> But first a general comment. AI is pretty much a mechanization of
> traditional epistemology. Dreyfus seems to acknowledge this in the
> first couple of pages. So if AI does not work, that would suggest
> a problem with epistemology. So why do people like Dreyfus (and
> Searle, and others) criticize AI but not criticize epistemology?
> (OK, that's a rhetorical question).
Dryfus' solution to this is to say AI's model of epistemology is wrong and
needs to be embodied, flat, and non-representational.
>
> To me, epistemology has always seemed a bit silly. And it has
> puzzled me that intelligent philosophers fail to see that it
> is silly.
>
Epistemology is not really the same scope as AI. Beyond learning and
building knowledge, AI also includes transcendental aspects of
consciousness
and self (soul?), which are in metaphysics. AI also covers the creation
and
appreciation of beautiful things, which is in the 3rd pillar of
philosophy:
esthetics. So, I believe AI touches on nearly all aspects of philosophy.
> "Isaac" <groups@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> writes:
>
>>First, critique, page 11, line 20:
>>"I agree that it is time for a positive account of Heideggerian AI and
of
>>an
>>underlying Heideggerian neuroscience, but I think Wheeler is the one
>>looking
>>in the wrong place. Merely by supposing that Heidegger is concerned
with
>>problem solving and action oriented representations, Wheeler's project
>>reflects not a step beyond Agre but a regression to aspects of
pre-Brooks
>>GOFAI. Heidegger, indeed, claims that that skillful coping is basic,
but
>>he
>>is also clear that, all coping takes place on the background coping he
>>calls
>>being-in-the-world that doesn't involve any form of representation at
all.
>
> Comment (on Dreyfus): I have no problem with the idea of skillful
> coping. The trouble I have with some of the philosophy, is that
> it often tends to come across as mystical in its reliance on vague
> ideas such as "being in the world".
>
>>see: Michael Wheeler, Reconstructing the Cognitive World, 222-223.
>
>>My comment:
>>"Assuming that by "thinking" you mean conscious thought, I cannot see
how
>>thinking is a bridge that necessarily follows from memories/beliefs not
>>being solely inner entities. It seems to me that inner and outer
>>representations can be bridged without thought. Isn't this what occurs
in
>>an unconscious (reflex) reaction to a complex external even, which is an
>>automatic bridge and generates a thoughtful, usually accurate response
but
>>often before we even have a chance to think about it. Inner/outer
>>representations seems semantically vague here. Also, cannot conscious
>>thought can endeavor itself with in purely inner or out representations
>>without ever bridging them? I guess, it is the "therefore" that gives
me
>>pause here."
>
> In a way, you are saying something similar to what I said above.
> That is, you are decrying the tendency to give accounts that seem
> mystical because of their reliance on rather vague ideas.
>
he does ground it more later in the paper, which I will present and
comment
on little by little. However, imho, I think is pattern of making huge
leaps
after "therefore" stays the same.
Cheers,
Ariel-
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