"Curt Welch" <curt@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
news:20081116234549.142$ia@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> "Isaac" <groups@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>> Reminder: I will post the paragraph(s) I have a comment about, and
>> highlight
>> the
>> particular words at issue by enclosing them between "***" characters.
>> I'll also include citations in the paper when helpful. I seek
>> (intelligent and informed) technical/theoretical critique or feedback
>> from anyone on this particular issue. Ask me for a copy of the paper
if
>> you are interested in the context and details.
>>
>> 2nd critique, on his page 12, line 4:
>> "Heidegger's im****tant insight is not that, when we solve problems, we
>> sometimes make use of representational equipment outside our bodies,
but
>> that being-in-the-world is more basic than thinking and solving
>> problems;that it is not representational at all. That is, when we are
>> coping at our best, ***we are drawn in by solicitations and respond
>> directly to them, so that the distinction between us and our
>> equipment--between inner and outer-vanishes***#1 As Heidegger sums it
>> up: I live in the understanding of writing, illuminating,
>> going-in-and-out, and the like. More precisely: as Dasein I am -- in
>> speaking, going, and understanding -- an act of understanding
>> dealing-with. My being in the world is nothing other than this
>> already-operating-with-understanding in this mode of being.[ii]
>>
>> Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's understanding of embedded embodied
coping,
>> then, is not that the mind is sometimes extended into the world but
>> rather that all such problem solving is derivative, that in our most
>> basic way of being, that is, as absorbed skillful copers, we are not
>> minds at all but one with the world. Heidegger sticks to the
>> phenomenon, when he makes the strange-sounding claim that, in its most
>> basic way of being, "Dasein is its world existingly."[iii]
>>
>> When you stop thinking that mind is what characterizes us most
basically
>> but, rather, that most basically we are absorbed copers, the
inner/outer
>> distinction becomes problematic. There's no easily askable question as
to
>> whether the absorbed coping is in me or in the world. According to
>> Heidegger, intentional content isn't in the mind, nor in some 3rd realm
>> (as it is for Husserl), nor in the world; it isn't anywhere. It's an
>> embodied way of being-towards. Thus for a Heideggerian, all forms of
>> cognitivist externalism presuppose a more basic existential externalism
>> where even to speak of "externalism" is misleading since such talk
>> presupposes a contrast with the internal. Compared to this genuinely
>> Heideggerian view, ***extended-mind externalism is contrived, trivial,
>> and irrelevant***#2.
>>
>>
<sniped citations>
>>
>>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> -------
>>
>> My critique #1:
>>
>> seems that the "distinction between us and our equipment... is
vanished"
>> is just describing the unconscious automation process that takes over
>> body functions and relieves the conscious mind to be unaware that its
>> equipment was drawn into responding to solicitations. This in many
ways
>> seems to just be alluding to the domain of our unconscious being that
>> responds like dominos that fall automatically in response to many
>> contextual solicitations. I do not see how this all makes a solid
>> argument that conscious thought is unified and inseparable from "our
>> equipment" (i.e., body). At best this is a very weak, if not
completely
>> flawed, logic in inferring that our sense (act) of being in the world
"is
>> not representational at all". The text that appears to clarify this
>> assertion just seems to be a string of conclusory declarations without
a
>> solid logical foundation. Even a plausible syllogism would be helpful
>> here."
>>
>> My critique #2:
>>
>> is not the Heideggerian view requiring this unity between the mind and
>> the world result in a "contrived, trivial, and irrelevant" world
>> representation scheme in people when the events in the world are so far
>> beyond a person's ability to cope (relative to there internal
>> representation/value system) that they just end up contriving a trivial
>> and irrelevant internal world that is just projected onto a "best
>> fit/nearest neighbor" of a representation that they can cope with. In
>> this way, there is no absorbed coping because it requires a perfect and
>> accurate absorption scheme between our mind (inner) and the world
(outer)
>> that does not exist and cannot be magically created, even biologically.
>> If you ignore this aspect of the Heideggerian view then what you end up
>> with is nothing much more than an "ignorance is bliss" cognitive model
>> that is not too different from what you say is wrong with Brook's
>> approach. That is, your ****trayal of the Heideggerian view of absorbed
>> coping would exactly model the thinking and representation behavior of
>> insects, which certainly is not the conscious, cognitive model of
humans.
>> Thus, this Heideggerian view of absorbed coping is either insufficient
to
>> describe the human condition or it renders indistinguishable insects
from
>> humans; either way it does not seem to uniquely capture the behavior at
>> the level of human consciousness and is, thus, flawed at best. That
>> is, if this Heideggerian view of absorbed coping equally applies to any
>> animals or insects then it is not really helpful to modeling or
shedding
>> light on higher human intellectual behavior, which, of course, is the
>> sole subject/goal of AI. Moreover, this "perfect absorption" is a
>> complete illusion and in practice will only exist in the most
predictable
>> and simple situations. From another angle, how is this Heideggerian
view
>> of absorbed coping much different from the standard psychological model
>> of projection where our internal model/representation is simply
projected
>> onto the world (or a subset frame of it) and we just trick ourselves
into
>> believing that we are completely and accurately absorbed with the true
>> essence of the frame problem. this Heideggerian view of absorbed
coping
>> seems to much more fit the unconscious aspects of the human condition,
>> which is more insect/animal like. This all seems to be logically
flawed
>> and/or a very weak foundation for grandiose conclusions about what
>> philosophical approach/model is needed to solve the frame problem and
>> human consciousness. Maybe I am missing something critical here that
can
>> make sense of it. Please clarify the logic.
>>
>> Any thoughts on this issue?
>>
>> Ariel B.
>
> I'm an engineer, not a philosopher.
>As such, nearly everything you write
> strikes me as silly and odd and misguided.
I am an engineer, scientist, philosopher, and roboticist. Of course, the
problem does not reside strictly in any one dicipline or skill set, so I
am
not surprised that an implementation oriented thinker will find the
abstractions too obtuse for utility.
>I hardly know where to begin to
> comment.
>
> I find this sort of philosophical debate to be a pointless and endless
> game
> at trying to define, and redefine words to make them fit together in a
> more
> pleasing way. You can't solve AI by playing with words. You have to do
> it
> using empirical evidence.
I disagree. Reverse engineering will not solve the problem and may
actually
lead to many dead ends. It will take a new theory and philosophy to do
it.
Think of it like trying to emperically come up with QED or Relativity w/o
any new theory or philosophy of physics.
> It's not a problem which can be solved by pure
> philosophy.
>
True, but you can't just do it bottom up either. You can miss the big
picture, which philosophy can shed light on.
> For example, you speak of this "unity between the mind and the world".
> What exactly is the "mind" and the "world"?
I did not say this. If you read my intro, I was quoting from Dryfus'
paper.
>You can't resolve this sort of
> question just by talking about such things. Words are defined by their
> connection to empirical evidence and without empirical evidence, the
words
> are basically meaningless - or at minimal, available for use in endless
> pointless debates and redefinition based on usage alone.
for sure symantics can lead to circular definitions, but tossing out
anything not empiracle is "throughing the baby out with the bath water";
that is, you toss out powerful abstractions that bridge large gaps
empirical
evidence.
>
> The problem we run into here is that without a concrete definition of
how
> the brain works and what the mind is, we can't make any real progress on
> the types of issues you are touching on here. How can we make any
> progress
> debating the nature of the connection between the "mind" and the "world"
> when we can't agree what the mind is? And if we can't agree what the
mind
> is, we can't really agree on anything it creates - like it's view of the
> world - which is the foundation of what the word "world" is referring
to.
>
> You can't resolve any of these questions until you can first resolve
> fundamental questions such as the mind body problem and consciousness in
> general.
>
Well, we have to talk about the trinity or we'd get no where, but I agree
that any usage of those words must be very tentative and cannot lead to
sweeping conclusions w/o a scientific definition of each, which I say
would
require a theory of mind (not connecting a million data points).
> I have my answers to these questions, but my answers are not shared or
> agreed on by any sort of majority of society so my foundational beliefs
> can't be used as any sort of proof of what is right. It call comes back
> to
> the requirement that we produce empirical data to back up our beliefs.
> And
> for this subject, that means we have to solve AI, and solve all the
> mysteries of the human brain. Once we have that hard empirical science
> work finished, then we will have the knowledge needed, to resolve the
sort
> of philosophical debates you bring up here. Until then, endless debate
> about what "merging mind and world" might mean, is nearly pointless in
my
> view.
>
> Having said all that, I'll give you my view of all this, and the answers
> to
> your questions as best as I can figure out.
>
> I'm a strict materialist or physicalist. I believe the brain is doing
> nothing more than performing a fairly straight forward signal processing
> function which is mapping sensory input data flows into effector output
> data flows. There is nothing else there happening, and nothing else
that
> needs to be explained in terms of what the "mind" is or what
> "consciousness" is.
I don't think you can call anything as chaotic as the brain doing anything
"straight forward". The Earth's weather is infinitely more straitforward
than the humand mind/brain and we cannot model it worth a damn even with
all
the most powerful computers in the world.
>The mind and consciousness is not something separate
> from the brain, it simply is the brain and what the brain is doing.
>
> It's often suggested that humans have a property of "consciousness"
which
> doesn't exist in computers or maybe insects (based on the use of
"insect"
> above). I see that idea as totally unsup****ted by the facts. It's
nothing
> more than a popular myth - and a perfect example of the nonsense that is
> constantly batted around in these mostly pointless physiological
debates.
>
> There is no major function which exists in the human brain which doesn't
> already exists in our computers and our robots which are already acting
as
> autonomous agents interacting with their environment. The only
difference
> between humans and robots, is that humans currently have a more advanced
> signal processing system - not one which is substantially different in
any
> significant way - just one which is better mostly by measures of degree,
> and not measures of kind.
I don't think you could be farther away from the truth. The brain
computes
in ways that is so different (an often oposite) of how our signal
processing
works that it is in another universe by comparison. For example, the core
of the brain's sensory processing seems to be a kind of synethstesia based
system, which is exactly what all engineers would avoid like the plague.
I
could go on and on with counter examples.
>
> Many people however tend to believe the human "mind" and human
> "consciousness" is something different from what our robots are doing by
a
> major and im****tant degree of kind. They believe we are something no
one
> yet understands, and something that doesn't exist in our machines at
all.
> I reject that notion completely.
>
> This belief we find in so many humans - that they are uniquely different
> from the machines - is a result of an invalid self-image the brains
> naturally tend to form about themselves. Human tend to think they are
> something they are not in this regard. They believe their "mind" is
> somehow different and separate from the brain, when there is no
separation
> at all. The endless mind body debates and all the other debates which
> spin
> off from it, are the result of failing to see that the apparent
separation
> is only an illusion.
>
> This illusion is represented by the simple idea that our internal
> awareness, doesn't seem to be an identity with neural activity. That
> "seeing blue" doesn't seem to us to be "just neural activity". Seeing
> blue
> seems to be something of a completely different nature to us than
"neurons
> firing". However, all evidence adds up to the fact that these are an
> identity - that they are in fact one and the same thing. Not something
> "created by" the activity of the brain, but simply, the brain activity
> itself.
>
> Now, I wrote all that just to try and make it clear to you where I'm
> coming
> from and what I believe in.
>
> Because of what I believe, the mind body problem, and AI, and
> consciousness, translates to a very straight forward problem of science
> and
> engineering, not a philosophy problem in any respect. The brain is just
a
> reinforcement trained parallel signal processing network which produces
> our
> behavior (both external behaviors and internal thoughts) as a reaction
to
> the current environment.
hebbian learning was known since the '50's but that has not lead to
anything
practical because it may necessary but not sufficient. For example,
hebbian
learning does not even begin to solve the frame problem. Since this is so
strait forward, how do you propose reinforcement training (i.e., Pavlov's
dog) can be used to robustly deal with the frame problem?
>
> From this perceptive, let me jump in and debate the words you had issue
> with:
>
> we are drawn in by solicitations and respond
> directly to them, so that the distinction between us and our
> equipment--between inner and outer-vanishes
>
> I think at the lowest levels of what is happening in the brain, it is
> obvious that the brain is simply reacting to what is happening in the
> environment - that is what the brain is doing by definition in my view.
> We
> simply "respond directly to them". That is all we every do.
really? So, being an engineer you will know that "reactions" to input is
just another way of saying that you have a control system. However, any
control system needs a model to determine the proper control surface for
the
input landscape; that is, model building. Thus, the brian is about
building
useful models of the environment via sensory synergy. In this way, I
completely disagree with your assertion that "brain is simply reacting to
what is happening in the environment "
>
> But this is where it gets very messy. What is meant by "we" in the
above?
>
> For me, it is obvious the only "we" that exists is a human body and the
> human body is simply reacting to its environment and that's pretty much
> the
> end of the story. It's no more complex or mystical in any sense than a
> robot reacting to its environment or a rock reacting to its environment.
> The only difference is that the more complex machines like the human and
> robot react in more complex ways to their environment than the rock
does.
>
<sniped for brevity>
> If the part of the brain which represents "dogs" is damaged, we can
become
> unable to see a dog.
Well, Dreyfus disagrees with you on this point. He says there is no
representation of a dog in the brain. How do you argue against that?
>We can look right at it, and have no clue what it is
> we are looking at.
All the evidence I am aware of re the brain is that such concepts are not
located in any one place which you can damage to lose only the recognition
of a dog. BTW, this is another example of how the brain is radically
different than our computing systems.
>At the same time, if you stimulate the correct parts of
> a brain, it's mostly likely that the person would re****t they were
"seeing
> a dog" when there was no dog there.
There is no research ever showing that this is possible. Please cite the
research that sup****ts your belief. I only know of music being able to be
stimulated to be heard in the brain.
>So what is it we are actually
> "seeing". Is it the dog we are responding to when we say we see a dog,
or
> is the neural activity in one part of the brain which other part of the
> brain is responding to by producing the words "I see a dog"?
>
I think we should stay away from consciousness in this discussion or else
we
will get no where by forking out to too many infinities.
> It can be argued that what we actually respond to is not the physical
dog
> out in the word, but that we are responding to the brain activity.
Of course, the model of the dog.
> However, in a normally functioning human brain, the brain activity only
> shows up in the brain, when there is a dog in our field of vision - so
the
> distinction isn't im****tant.
>
> So when we use the the word "we", or "self" what actually are we talking
> about? Just like with the dog, are we talking about the phsyical thing
> "out there"? Or are we talking about the brain activity which
represents
> the physical thing out there? The confusion here of course is that,
> unlike
> with the dog example, the physical thing out there and the brain
activity,
> overlap. The brain activity is part of the human body which is thinking
> about itself.
Again, I think we should stay away from consciousness in this discussion
or
else we will get no where by forking out to too many infinities. Starting
from lower levels of the brain is more practical here.
> Like when we use the word "dog" it's not clear whether we are talking
> about
> the brain activity which represents the dog, or the physical dog, it's
not
> clear what we are talking about when we talk about "we".
>
> So lets go back to the words:
>
> we are drawn in by solicitations and respond
> directly to them, so that the distinction between us and our
> equipment--between inner and outer-vanishes
>
> Which "we" might these words be making reference to? I really don't
know
> because I don't know for sure what this guy was trying to communicate
with
> these words.
>
I believe he means our brain circuits engage phenominon by melding with it
and becoming a mirror image such that the two are not seprable, thus no
representations of the object in the brain just a bunch of organically
melded dominoes that hit one to another like "reality" would.
> But then we get to the "us" and "our equipment". Again, was the "us"
and
> "our equipment" a reference to the physical body of the person and the
> physical equipment, or a reference to the brain activity inside the
> person's brain which represented all this stuff?
>
> And which "distinction" is he making reference to? The distinction
> between
> the human body and the physical stuff of the equipment? Or the
> distinction
> between the brain activity which represents the equipment and the brain
> activity which represents the human?
I believe he is saying that phenomenon is internalized w/o distinctions;
i.e., you become the phenomenon. As opossed to you making a model of the
object as a seeprate token to use in your brain system to plan your
actions.
>
<snipped for brevity>
> As such, when the "dog" response is inhibited because some other
response
> like "big scary lion which is about to eat us" is produced, we end up
not
> "seeing" the dog. When asked later if there was a dog next to the lion,
> we
> will have no memory of the dog at all simply because we never "saw" the
> dog
> - i.e., the dog neural activity was blocked by other activity of higher
> priority. We would say, "we didn't notice the dog".
>
> This is true about most of how we respond to the environment. If we see
a
> complex scene, the brain picks the reaction which it believes is the
> "best"
> for that situation - we will see one object first, and ignore everything
> else. We will "focus on" the object we "care about" the most.
>
I think you digress here. The issue is about cognitive architecture wrt
to
phenomenon and building "correct" actions, not about focus of attention
even
if that does act as an initial filter of what info we get as input to the
process. Again, let's stay away from conciousness here. That is a
seperate
thread all together.
>
> This happens because when we are in a room, there will be all sorts of
> brain activity representing that room, and our location in the room.
> There
> is always brain activity which represents the state of the environment
> around us. But when we watch a TV show, or a movie, and we focus on the
> what is happening in the show long enough, the brain state which
> represents
> the fact that we are in a room watching a TV will start to fade and be
> slowly be replaced by the events of the show. The less distraction there
> is
> from the room (dark lights with no other noise or motion in the room)
the
> greater this effect is.
>
> This is one effect that might be what the words "distinction between us
> and
> our equipment--between inner and outer-vanishes", could have been making
> reference to.
Dryfus is not talking about conciousness, he is talking about the
architecture of low level brain circuits that do ro do not make
distinctions
between "us" and phenomenon.
> But then there's the other way to look at this. Just like the "dog"
> exists
> for us as brain activity, our entire world exists for us as brain
> activity.
> As such, there never really was much distinction between the brain
> activity
> which represents our inner self and brain activity which represents
outer
> stuff. It's all still just "more brain activity". The ability to
> classify
> some brain activity as "outer stuff" and some brain activity as "inner
> stuff" is mostly a learned response. It's the way our brain is trained
to
> respond to the enviro0nment - by creating that inner and outer
> classifications. As such, we can also train ourselves to think in terms
> of
> being "one with the world". Or "extend our consciousness outside
> ourselves" - or whatever sill way some one might talk about this.
>
In his paper, he considers chaotic neural networks as being more at "one
with the world" than classic AI's more (fuzzy) rule based systems.
<snipped>
> fact. Stop the brain activity, and my "world" goes away. I will no
> longer
> be "aware" of what is around me. I will no longer be "seeing" the
> computer
Again, let's stay away from awareness here. A seperate issue.
<snipped for brevity>
> I've not tried to comment on your critiques of the words yet, but this
> post
> is too long already so I'll stop hear for now.
>
Your detailed thougths are greatly appreciated. See if my feedback can
help
focus ideas for or against Dreyfus' thesis or my critique of his ideas.
<snip>
> you bring up here must be translated back to the actions of such a
machine
> in order to be understood. If you can't translates these ideas and
> questions and issues back to the operation of a machine like this, then
> you
> don't have any hope of understand what it is you are talking about and
you
> don't have any hope of understanding what the words mean or why one set
of
> words is a better or worse description of what is happening.
yes, but we do have to proceed with best working theories to give
tentative
meaning to the symantics so we can work towards articulating the
distinctions we feel with scientific definititions... years in the future.
Best regards,
Ariel B.
>
> --
> Curt Welch
> http://CurtWelch.Com/
> curt@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> http://NewsReader.Com/
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