On Nov 16, 9:10 pm, "Isaac" <gro...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
>
>
news:fcc39fdd-9886-401f-88bd-510528b75fa5@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> > On Nov 16, 6:12 pm, "Isaac" <gro...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> >> Reminder: I will post the paragraph(s) I have a comment about, and
> >> highlight
> >> the
> >> particular words at issue by enclosing them between "***" characters.
> >> I'll
> >> also include citations in the paper when helpful. I seek (intelligent
and
> >> informed) technical/theoretical critique or feedback from anyone on
this
> >> particular issue. Ask/email me for a copy of the paper if you are
> >> interested in
> >> the context and details.
>
> >> 2nd critique, on his page 12, line 4:
> >> "Heidegger's im****tant insight is not that, when we solve problems,
we
> >> sometimes make use of representational equipment outside our bodies,
but
> >> that being-in-the-world is more basic than thinking and solving
> >> problems;that it is not representational at all. That is, when we
are
> >> coping at our best, ***we are drawn in by solicitations and respond
> >> directly
> >> to them, so that the distinction between us and our
equipment--between
> >> inner
> >> and outer-vanishes***#1 As Heidegger sums it up:
> >> I live in the understanding of writing, illuminating,
going-in-and-out,
> >> and
> >> the like. More precisely: as Dasein I am -- in speaking, going, and
> >> understanding -- an act of understanding dealing-with. My being in
the
> >> world is nothing other than this already-operating-with-understanding
in
> >> this mode of being.[ii]
>
> <snip>
> I did not understand the significance of the Kant, VR, phantom-limb,
etc.
> quotes. Please clarify what you mean in concrete terms.
>
> > If I am just learning to use a hammer the first time I must extend the
> > perception of the end of my arm out about a foot further. I must learn
> > to hit an object, nail, a foot further out than I would normally hit
> > things. This is more like the telepresence in our adjustments to our
> > outer sense...
>
> OK, but how does this sup****t or contradict Dryfus' contention that we
have
> no internal representations that Dryfus quotes Heidegger as saying we
have
> in the above section?
>
I suppose further conversation about the implications of telepresence
would and representationalism have not been ruled out by what Dyfus
says, unless he only wants to make a stronger but still probable
argument he shoots himself in the foot. Jeez, representationalism, is
the best theory since Kant and still rules neuroscience,
What is Representationalism?
Representationalism is the philosophical position that the world we
see in conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a
miniature virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal
representation. Representationalism is also known (in psychology) as
Indirect Perception, and (in philosophy) as Indirect Realism, or
Epistemological Dualism.
Why Representationalism?
As incredible as it might seem intuitively, representationalism is the
only alternative that is consistent with the facts of perception.
The Epistemological Fact (strongest theory): It is impossible to have
experience beyond the sensory surface.
Dreams, Hallucinations, and Visual Illusions clearly indicate that the
world of experience is not the same thing as the world itself.
The observed Properties of Phenomenal Perspective clearly indicate
that the world of experience is not the same as the external world
that it represents.
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html
Representationalism (or indirect realism) with respect to perception
is the view that "we are never aware of physical objects, [but rather]
we are only indirectly aware of them, in virtue of a direct awareness
of an intermediary [mental] object. (Dancy, 145) Because there are
both direct and indirect objects of awareness in representationalism,
a correspondence relation arises between the mental entities directly
perceived and external objects which those mental entities represent.
And thus perceptual error occurs when the two objects of awareness do
not correspond sufficiently well. In opposition to
representationalism, both (direct) realism and idealism agree that
perception is direct and unmediated, despite their disagreements about
what the object of perception is. (Dancy, 145) In any form of direct
perception, no correspondence relation****p is possible, since there is
only one object of perception. Thus only representationalism will give
rise to the view that perceptual errors exist and must be part of a
theory of perception. Nevertheless, both idealism and realism must
still account for the facts that are referred to as "perceptual
errors" by the representationalist.
http://www.dianahsieh.com/undergrad/rape.html
....representation is central to psychology as well, for the mind too
is a system that represents the world and possible worlds in various
ways. Our hopes, fears, beliefs, memories, perceptions, intentions,
and desires all involve our ideas about (our mental models of) the
world and other worlds. This is what humanist philosophers and
psychologists have always said, of course, but until recently they had
no sup****t from science...
http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0162.html?
>
>
>
>
> >> Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's understanding of embedded embodied
coping,
> >> then, is not that the mind is sometimes extended into the world but
> >> rather
> >> that all such problem solving is derivative, that in our most basic
way
> >> of
> >> being, that is, as absorbed skillful copers, we are not minds at all
but
> >> one
> >> with the world. Heidegger sticks to the phenomenon, when he makes
the
> >> strange-sounding claim that, in its most basic way of being, "Dasein
is
> >> its
> >> world existingly."[iii]
>
> > Is this like, phenomenology, you know the attempt to extend the
> > inescapable self and somehow use it as proof that the external world
> > exists for certain by the process of eliminating material objects from
> > language and replacing them with hypothetical propositions about
> > observers and experiences, committing us to the existence of a new
> > class of ontological object altogether: the sensibilia or sense-data
> > which can exist independently of experience, and thus refute the
> > sceptics strong arguments?
>
> I think phenomenology as an objectified (i.e., represented) concept is
what
> Heidegger claims, but I understand Dryfus as saying here that he agrees
with
> Merleau-Ponty's philosophy that the phenominon and our perceiving of it
> become indestingishable from each other; i.e, we have no internal
> representations of the phenomenon.
>
> Do you have any comments on my cretique of these paragraphs below?
>
Plenty but your moving to fast, this could take months, even years,
with some of you hard cases.
> <snip>
>
> >>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> >> My critique #1:
>
> >> seems that the "distinction between us and our equipment... is
vanished"
> >> is
> >> just describing the unconscious automation process that takes over
body
> >> functions and relieves the conscious mind to be unaware that its
> >> equipment
> >> was drawn into responding to solicitations. This in many ways seems
to
> >> just
> >> be alluding to the domain of our unconscious being that responds like
> >> dominos that fall automatically in response to many contextual
> >> solicitations. I do not see how this all makes a solid argument that
> >> conscious thought is unified and inseparable from "our equipment"
(i.e.,
> >> body). At best this is a very weak, if not completely flawed, logic
in
> >> inferring that our sense (act) of being in the world "is not
> >> representational at all". The text that appears to clarify this
> >> assertion
> >> just seems to be a string of conclusory declarations without a solid
> >> logical
> >> foundation. Even a plausible syllogism would be helpful here."
>
> >> My critique #2:
>
> >> is not the Heideggerian view requiring this unity between the mind
and
> >> the
> >> world result in a "contrived, trivial, and irrelevant" world
> >> representation
> >> scheme in people when the events in the world are so far beyond a
> >> person's
> >> ability to cope (relative to there internal representation/value
system)
> >> that they just end up contriving a trivial and irrelevant internal
world
> >> that is just projected onto a "best fit/nearest neighbor" of a
> >> representation that they can cope with. In this way, there is no
> >> absorbed
> >> coping because it requires a perfect and accurate absorption scheme
> >> between
> >> our mind (inner) and the world (outer) that does not exist and cannot
be
> >> magically created, even biologically. If you ignore this aspect of
the
> >> Heideggerian view then what you end up with is nothing much more than
an
> >> "ignorance is bliss" cognitive model that is not too different from
what
> >> you
> >> say is wrong with Brook's approach. That is, your ****trayal of the
> >> Heideggerian view of absorbed coping would exactly model the thinking
and
> >> representation behavior of insects, which certainly is not the
conscious,
> >> cognitive model of humans. Thus, this Heideggerian view of absorbed
> >> coping
> >> is either insufficient to describe the human condition or it renders
> >> indistinguishable insects from humans; either way it does not seem to
> >> uniquely capture the behavior at the level of human consciousness and
is,
> >> thus, flawed at best. That is, if this Heideggerian view of
absorbed
> >> coping equally applies to any animals or insects then it is not
really
> >> helpful to modeling or shedding light on higher human intellectual
> >> behavior, which, of course, is the sole subject/goal of AI.
Moreover,
> >> this
> >> "perfect absorption" is a complete illusion and in practice will only
> >> exist
> >> in the most predictable and simple situations. From another angle,
how is
> >> this Heideggerian view of absorbed coping much different from the
> >> standard
> >> psychological model of projection where our internal
model/representation
> >> is
> >> simply projected onto the world (or a subset frame of it) and we just
> >> trick
> >> ourselves into believing that we are completely and accurately
absorbed
> >> with
> >> the true essence of the frame problem. this Heideggerian view of
> >> absorbed
> >> coping seems to much more fit the unconscious aspects of the human
> >> condition, which is more insect/animal like. This all seems to be
> >> logically
> >> flawed and/or a very weak foundation for grandiose conclusions about
what
> >> philosophical approach/model is needed to solve the frame problem and
> >> human
> >> consciousness. Maybe I am missing something critical here that can
make
> >> sense of it. Please clarify the logic.
>
> >> Any thoughts on this issue?
>
> >> Ariel B.
>
> >> "Isaac" <gro...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
>
> >>news:491d60f6$0$33588$742ec2ed@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> >> > All,
>
> >> > I have critiqued in great detail a recent write paper by Prof.
Hubert
> >> > Dreyfus entitled "Why Heideggerian AI Failed and how Fixing it
would
> >> > Require
> >> > making it more Heideggerian" . I can email a copy of it to whom
ever
> >> > is
> >> > interested. For his bio, see:
> >> >http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/
>
> >> > I want to stimulate discussion on this topic by posting my
critiques
> >> > little
> >> > by little and getting comments from the AI community on the news
> >> > groups.
> >> > However, before I start I want to get a feel for how many know of
his
> >> > work
> >> > and/or would be interested in an intellectual debate for and
against
> >> > his
> >> > many anti-AI positions.
>
> >> > I hope many will respond to this posting with interest so I can
begin
> >> > posting each part of this paper I find issues with and my reasoned
> >> > critique
> >> > for others to comment on.
>
> >> > Thanks,
> >> > Ariel-
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