On Nov 16, 6:23 pm, "Isaac" <gro...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> Here is my 2nd installment of many critiques of this paper. Not all
issues
> will
> resonate will everyone so pick and choose what you find interesting to
> debate pro/con
> and I will defend any of my comments.
>
> I will post the paragraph(s) I have a comment about, and highlight the
> particular words at issue by enclosing them between "***" characters.
I'll
> also include citations in the paper when helpful. I seek (intelligent
and
> informed) technical/theoretical critique or feedback from anyone on this
> particular issue.
>
> See page 11, line 20 of his paper where it says:
> "I agree that it is time for a positive account of Heideggerian AI and
of an
> underlying Heideggerian neuroscience, but I think Wheeler is the one
looking
> in the wrong place. Merely by supposing that Heidegger is concerned
with
> problem solving and action oriented representations, Wheeler's project
> reflects not a step beyond Agre but a regression to aspects of
pre-Brooks
> GOFAI. Heidegger, indeed, claims that that skillful coping is basic,
but he
> is also clear that, all coping takes place on the background coping he
calls
> being-in-the-world that doesn't involve any form of representation at
all.
>
> see: Michael Wheeler, Reconstructing the Cognitive World, 222-223.
>
> Wheeler's cognitivist misreading of Heidegger leads him to overestimate
the
> im****tance of Andy Clark's and David Chalmers' attempt to free us from
the
> Cartesian idea that the mind is essentially inner by pointing out that
in
> thinking we sometimes make use of external artifacts like pencil, paper,
and
> computers.[i] Unfortunately, this argument for the extended mind
preserves
> the Cartesian assumption that our basic way of relating to the world is
by
> using propositional representations such as beliefs and memories whether
> they are in the mind or in notebooks in the world. In effect, while
Brooks
> happily dispenses with representations where coping is concerned, all
> Chalmers, Clark, and Wheeler give us as a supposedly radical new
> Heideggerian approach to the human way of being in the world is to note
that
> memories and beliefs are not necessarily inner entities and that,
> ***therefore, thinking bridges the distinction between inner and outer
> representations.*** "
>
> My Critique:
> "Assuming that by "thinking" you mean conscious thought, I cannot see
how
> thinking is a bridge that necessarily follows from memories/beliefs not
> being solely inner entities. It seems to me that inner and outer
> representations can be bridged without thought. Isn't this what occurs
in
> an unconscious (reflex) reaction to a complex external even, which is an
> automatic bridge and generates a thoughtful, usually accurate response
but
> often before we even have a chance to think about it. Inner/outer
> representations seems semantically vague here. Also, cannot conscious
> thought can endeavor itself with in purely inner or out representations
> without ever bridging them? I guess, it is the "therefore" that gives
me
> pause here."
>
> Any thoughts on this issue?
>
A learned skill like particular musical styles on the piano require
that the fingers move faster than conscious planning can accomplish.
The bridge in this case might be complex patterns stored in the
cerebellum, initiated by simple memory data in the basal ganglia,
which is triggered by some partial sense datum.
I think I agree but there is as yet no known way to escape from
skepticism concerning certainty on the issue. If memory is just the
stimulation of the same neurons that the senses stimulate, and this
information is stored in a much compressed style which can initiate
cascades that lead to the patterns, solipsism continues not to be
ruled out. It is still possible that we are in a matrix style delusion
with wires hoked to our brains.
.......In a sparse distributed network - memory is a type of
perception.....The act of remembering and the act of perceiving both
detect a pattern in a vary large choice of possible patterns....When
we remember we recreate the act of the original perception - that is
we relocate the pattern by a process similar to the one we used to
perceive the pattern originally.
http://www.kk.org/outofcontrol/ch2-d.html
The question is really how rusty 20th century philosophy, albeit with
a Kantian twist, can deal with neuroscience discoveries, of the ebb
and flow of experience producing parts of the brain.
> Ariel B.
>
> "Alpha" <omegazero2...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
>
>
news:f8636636-6ee8-4c92-9905-a89145bc06b2@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> On Nov 14, 9:46 pm, "Isaac" <gro...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>
> > All,
>
> >> I have critiqued in great detail a recent write paper by Prof. Hubert
> >> Dreyfus entitled "Why Heideggerian AI Failed and how Fixing it would
> >> Require
> >> making it more Heideggerian" . I can email a copy of it to whom ever
is
> >> interested.
>
> >Please send a copy to omegazero2...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Ariel. Thanks!
>
> >Why don't you post a summary of that paper and your key critique
> >points here.
>
> >> For his bio, see:http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/
>
> >> I want to stimulate discussion on this topic by posting my critiques
> >> little
> >> by little and getting comments from the AI community on the news
groups.
> >> However, before I start I want to get a feel for how many know of his
> >> work
> >> and/or would be interested in an intellectual debate for and against
his
> >> many anti-AI positions.
>
> >> I hope many will respond to this posting with interest so I can begin
> >> posting each part of this paper I find issues with and my reasoned
> >> critique
> >> for others to comment on.
>
> >> Thanks,
> >> Ariel-
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