On Nov 16, 6:12 pm, "Isaac" <gro...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
> Reminder: I will post the paragraph(s) I have a comment about, and
highlight
> the
> particular words at issue by enclosing them between "***" characters.
I'll
> also include citations in the paper when helpful. I seek (intelligent
and
> informed) technical/theoretical critique or feedback from anyone on this
> particular issue. Ask/email me for a copy of the paper if you are
> interested in
> the context and details.
>
> 2nd critique, on his page 12, line 4:
> "Heidegger's im****tant insight is not that, when we solve problems, we
> sometimes make use of representational equipment outside our bodies, but
> that being-in-the-world is more basic than thinking and solving
> problems;that it is not representational at all. That is, when we are
> coping at our best, ***we are drawn in by solicitations and respond
directly
> to them, so that the distinction between us and our equipment--between
inner
> and outer-vanishes***#1 As Heidegger sums it up:
> I live in the understanding of writing, illuminating, going-in-and-out,
and
> the like. More precisely: as Dasein I am -- in speaking, going, and
> understanding -- an act of understanding dealing-with. My being in the
> world is nothing other than this already-operating-with-understanding in
> this mode of being.[ii]
>
A phantom limb is the sensation that an amputated or missing limb
(even an organ, like the appendix) is still attached to the body and
is moving appropriately with other body parts.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phantom_limb
[A384] ...Now I maintain that all the difficulties commonly found in
these questions, and by means of which, as dogmatic objections, men
seek to gain credit for a deeper insight into the nature of things
than any to which the ordinary understanding can properly lay claim,
rest on a mere delusion by which they hypostatise what exists merely
in thought, and take it as a real object existing, in the same
character, outside the thinking subject.
In other words, they regard extension, which is nothing but
appearance, as a property of outer things that subsists [A385] even
apart from our sensibility, and hold that motion is due to these
things and really occurs in and by itself, apart from our senses.
http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/
-----------------------------------
[Matter as Telepresence]
What is telepresence? I agree with Kac's (1997) distinction between
virtual reality (VR) and telepresence: VR presents purely synthetic
sense-data lacking physical reality. Telepresence presents sense-data
that (1) claims to correspond to a remote physical reality and (2)
allows the remote user to perform a physical action and see the
results. The WWW has the potential to bring telepresence out of the
laboratory.
http://www.walkerart.org/gallery9/beyondinterface/goldberg_artist.html
If I am just learning to use a hammer the first time I must extend the
perception of the end of my arm out about a foot further. I must learn
to hit an object, nail, a foot further out than I would normally hit
things. This is more like the telepresence in our adjustments to our
outer sense...
--------------------------------
The implementation of a Tele-Presence Microscopy Facility allows a
user from a remote location to either observe and/or control state-of-
the-art instrumentation in a real time interactive mode. ...The vision
suggested in the call for proposals is to combine all of these over
the National Information Infrastructure in such a way that makes
distributed collaboration as useful to scientific experiments as being
in the same location.
http://www.amc.anl.gov/docs/anl/tpm/tpmexecsumm.html
> Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's understanding of embedded embodied coping,
> then, is not that the mind is sometimes extended into the world but
rather
> that all such problem solving is derivative, that in our most basic way
of
> being, that is, as absorbed skillful copers, we are not minds at all but
one
> with the world. Heidegger sticks to the phenomenon, when he makes the
> strange-sounding claim that, in its most basic way of being, "Dasein is
its
> world existingly."[iii]
>
Is this like, phenomenology, you know the attempt to extend the
inescapable self and somehow use it as proof that the external world
exists for certain by the process of eliminating material objects from
language and replacing them with hypothetical propositions about
observers and experiences, committing us to the existence of a new
class of ontological object altogether: the sensibilia or sense-data
which can exist independently of experience, and thus refute the
sceptics strong arguments?
> When you stop thinking that mind is what characterizes us most basically
> but, rather, that most basically we are absorbed copers, the inner/outer
> distinction becomes problematic. There's no easily askable question as
to
> whether the absorbed coping is in me or in the world. According to
> Heidegger, intentional content isn't in the mind, nor in some 3rd realm
(as
> it is for Husserl), nor in the world; it isn't anywhere. It's an
embodied
> way of being-towards. Thus for a Heideggerian, all forms of cognitivist
> externalism presuppose a more basic existential externalism where even
to
> speak of "externalism" is misleading since such talk presupposes a
contrast
> with the internal. Compared to this genuinely Heideggerian view,
> ***extended-mind externalism is contrived, trivial, and irrelevant***#2.
>
>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> [i] As Heidegger puts it: "The self must forget itself if, lost in the
world
> of equipment, it is to be able 'actually' to go to work and manipulate
> something." Being and Time, 405.
>
> [ii] Logic, 146. It's im****tant to realize that when he uses the term
> "understanding," Heidegger explains (with a little help from the
translator)
> that he means a kind of know-how:
>
> In German we say that someone can vorstehen something-literally, stand
in
> front of or ahead of it, that is, stand at its head, administer, manage,
> preside over it. This is equivalent to saying that he versteht sich
darauf,
> understands in the sense of being skilled or expert at it, has the
know-how
> of it. (Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, A.
> Hofstadter, Trans. Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1982, 276.)
>
> [iii] Being and Time, 416. To make sense of this slogan, it's im****tant
to
> be clear that Heidegger distinguishes the human world from the physical
> universe.
>
>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> My critique #1:
>
> seems that the "distinction between us and our equipment... is
vanished" is
> just describing the unconscious automation process that takes over body
> functions and relieves the conscious mind to be unaware that its
equipment
> was drawn into responding to solicitations. This in many ways seems to
just
> be alluding to the domain of our unconscious being that responds like
> dominos that fall automatically in response to many contextual
> solicitations. I do not see how this all makes a solid argument that
> conscious thought is unified and inseparable from "our equipment" (i.e.,
> body). At best this is a very weak, if not completely flawed, logic in
> inferring that our sense (act) of being in the world "is not
> representational at all". The text that appears to clarify this
assertion
> just seems to be a string of conclusory declarations without a solid
logical
> foundation. Even a plausible syllogism would be helpful here."
>
> My critique #2:
>
> is not the Heideggerian view requiring this unity between the mind and
the
> world result in a "contrived, trivial, and irrelevant" world
representation
> scheme in people when the events in the world are so far beyond a
person's
> ability to cope (relative to there internal representation/value system)
> that they just end up contriving a trivial and irrelevant internal world
> that is just projected onto a "best fit/nearest neighbor" of a
> representation that they can cope with. In this way, there is no
absorbed
> coping because it requires a perfect and accurate absorption scheme
between
> our mind (inner) and the world (outer) that does not exist and cannot be
> magically created, even biologically. If you ignore this aspect of the
> Heideggerian view then what you end up with is nothing much more than an
> "ignorance is bliss" cognitive model that is not too different from what
you
> say is wrong with Brook's approach. That is, your ****trayal of the
> Heideggerian view of absorbed coping would exactly model the thinking
and
> representation behavior of insects, which certainly is not the
conscious,
> cognitive model of humans. Thus, this Heideggerian view of absorbed
coping
> is either insufficient to describe the human condition or it renders
> indistinguishable insects from humans; either way it does not seem to
> uniquely capture the behavior at the level of human consciousness and
is,
> thus, flawed at best. That is, if this Heideggerian view of absorbed
> coping equally applies to any animals or insects then it is not really
> helpful to modeling or shedding light on higher human intellectual
> behavior, which, of course, is the sole subject/goal of AI. Moreover,
this
> "perfect absorption" is a complete illusion and in practice will only
exist
> in the most predictable and simple situations. From another angle, how
is
> this Heideggerian view of absorbed coping much different from the
standard
> psychological model of projection where our internal
model/representation is
> simply projected onto the world (or a subset frame of it) and we just
trick
> ourselves into believing that we are completely and accurately absorbed
with
> the true essence of the frame problem. this Heideggerian view of
absorbed
> coping seems to much more fit the unconscious aspects of the human
> condition, which is more insect/animal like. This all seems to be
logically
> flawed and/or a very weak foundation for grandiose conclusions about
what
> philosophical approach/model is needed to solve the frame problem and
human
> consciousness. Maybe I am missing something critical here that can make
> sense of it. Please clarify the logic.
>
> Any thoughts on this issue?
>
> Ariel B.
>
> "Isaac" <gro...@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
>
> news:491d60f6$0$33588$742ec2ed@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> > All,
>
> > I have critiqued in great detail a recent write paper by Prof. Hubert
> > Dreyfus entitled "Why Heideggerian AI Failed and how Fixing it would
> > Require
> > making it more Heideggerian" . I can email a copy of it to whom ever
is
> > interested. For his bio, see:
> >http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/
>
> > I want to stimulate discussion on this topic by posting my critiques
> > little
> > by little and getting comments from the AI community on the news
groups.
> > However, before I start I want to get a feel for how many know of his
work
> > and/or would be interested in an intellectual debate for and against
his
> > many anti-AI positions.
>
> > I hope many will respond to this posting with interest so I can begin
> > posting each part of this paper I find issues with and my reasoned
> > critique
> > for others to comment on.
>
> > Thanks,
> > Ariel-
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