Reminder: I will post the paragraph(s) I have a comment about, and
highlight
the
particular words at issue by enclosing them between "***" characters.
I'll
also include citations in the paper when helpful. I seek (intelligent and
informed) technical/theoretical critique or feedback from anyone on this
particular issue. Ask/email me for a copy of the paper if you are
interested in
the context and details.
2nd critique, on his page 12, line 4:
"Heidegger's im****tant insight is not that, when we solve problems, we
sometimes make use of representational equipment outside our bodies, but
that being-in-the-world is more basic than thinking and solving
problems;that it is not representational at all. That is, when we are
coping at our best, ***we are drawn in by solicitations and respond
directly
to them, so that the distinction between us and our equipment--between
inner
and outer-vanishes***#1 As Heidegger sums it up:
I live in the understanding of writing, illuminating, going-in-and-out,
and
the like. More precisely: as Dasein I am -- in speaking, going, and
understanding -- an act of understanding dealing-with. My being in the
world is nothing other than this already-operating-with-understanding in
this mode of being.[ii]
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's understanding of embedded embodied coping,
then, is not that the mind is sometimes extended into the world but rather
that all such problem solving is derivative, that in our most basic way of
being, that is, as absorbed skillful copers, we are not minds at all but
one
with the world. Heidegger sticks to the phenomenon, when he makes the
strange-sounding claim that, in its most basic way of being, "Dasein is
its
world existingly."[iii]
When you stop thinking that mind is what characterizes us most basically
but, rather, that most basically we are absorbed copers, the inner/outer
distinction becomes problematic. There's no easily askable question as to
whether the absorbed coping is in me or in the world. According to
Heidegger, intentional content isn't in the mind, nor in some 3rd realm
(as
it is for Husserl), nor in the world; it isn't anywhere. It's an embodied
way of being-towards. Thus for a Heideggerian, all forms of cognitivist
externalism presuppose a more basic existential externalism where even to
speak of "externalism" is misleading since such talk presupposes a
contrast
with the internal. Compared to this genuinely Heideggerian view,
***extended-mind externalism is contrived, trivial, and irrelevant***#2.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[i] As Heidegger puts it: "The self must forget itself if, lost in the
world
of equipment, it is to be able 'actually' to go to work and manipulate
something." Being and Time, 405.
[ii] Logic, 146. It's im****tant to realize that when he uses the term
"understanding," Heidegger explains (with a little help from the
translator)
that he means a kind of know-how:
In German we say that someone can vorstehen something-literally, stand in
front of or ahead of it, that is, stand at its head, administer, manage,
preside over it. This is equivalent to saying that he versteht sich
darauf,
understands in the sense of being skilled or expert at it, has the
know-how
of it. (Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, A.
Hofstadter, Trans. Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1982, 276.)
[iii] Being and Time, 416. To make sense of this slogan, it's im****tant
to
be clear that Heidegger distinguishes the human world from the physical
universe.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
My critique #1:
seems that the "distinction between us and our equipment... is vanished"
is
just describing the unconscious automation process that takes over body
functions and relieves the conscious mind to be unaware that its equipment
was drawn into responding to solicitations. This in many ways seems to
just
be alluding to the domain of our unconscious being that responds like
dominos that fall automatically in response to many contextual
solicitations. I do not see how this all makes a solid argument that
conscious thought is unified and inseparable from "our equipment" (i.e.,
body). At best this is a very weak, if not completely flawed, logic in
inferring that our sense (act) of being in the world "is not
representational at all". The text that appears to clarify this assertion
just seems to be a string of conclusory declarations without a solid
logical
foundation. Even a plausible syllogism would be helpful here."
My critique #2:
is not the Heideggerian view requiring this unity between the mind and the
world result in a "contrived, trivial, and irrelevant" world
representation
scheme in people when the events in the world are so far beyond a person's
ability to cope (relative to there internal representation/value system)
that they just end up contriving a trivial and irrelevant internal world
that is just projected onto a "best fit/nearest neighbor" of a
representation that they can cope with. In this way, there is no absorbed
coping because it requires a perfect and accurate absorption scheme
between
our mind (inner) and the world (outer) that does not exist and cannot be
magically created, even biologically. If you ignore this aspect of the
Heideggerian view then what you end up with is nothing much more than an
"ignorance is bliss" cognitive model that is not too different from what
you
say is wrong with Brook's approach. That is, your ****trayal of the
Heideggerian view of absorbed coping would exactly model the thinking and
representation behavior of insects, which certainly is not the conscious,
cognitive model of humans. Thus, this Heideggerian view of absorbed
coping
is either insufficient to describe the human condition or it renders
indistinguishable insects from humans; either way it does not seem to
uniquely capture the behavior at the level of human consciousness and is,
thus, flawed at best. That is, if this Heideggerian view of absorbed
coping equally applies to any animals or insects then it is not really
helpful to modeling or shedding light on higher human intellectual
behavior, which, of course, is the sole subject/goal of AI. Moreover,
this
"perfect absorption" is a complete illusion and in practice will only
exist
in the most predictable and simple situations. From another angle, how is
this Heideggerian view of absorbed coping much different from the standard
psychological model of projection where our internal model/representation
is
simply projected onto the world (or a subset frame of it) and we just
trick
ourselves into believing that we are completely and accurately absorbed
with
the true essence of the frame problem. this Heideggerian view of absorbed
coping seems to much more fit the unconscious aspects of the human
condition, which is more insect/animal like. This all seems to be
logically
flawed and/or a very weak foundation for grandiose conclusions about what
philosophical approach/model is needed to solve the frame problem and
human
consciousness. Maybe I am missing something critical here that can make
sense of it. Please clarify the logic.
Any thoughts on this issue?
Ariel B.
"Isaac" <groups@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote in message
news:491d60f6$0$33588$742ec2ed@[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> All,
>
> I have critiqued in great detail a recent write paper by Prof. Hubert
> Dreyfus entitled "Why Heideggerian AI Failed and how Fixing it would
> Require
> making it more Heideggerian" . I can email a copy of it to whom ever is
> interested. For his bio, see:
> http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/
>
> I want to stimulate discussion on this topic by posting my critiques
> little
> by little and getting comments from the AI community on the news groups.
> However, before I start I want to get a feel for how many know of his
work
> and/or would be interested in an intellectual debate for and against his
> many anti-AI positions.
>
> I hope many will respond to this posting with interest so I can begin
> posting each part of this paper I find issues with and my reasoned
> critique
> for others to comment on.
>
> Thanks,
> Ariel-
>
>
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