Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Scott F. WNUCK, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent-Respondent.
337 N.J.Super. 52, 766 A.2d 312
Submitted Dec. 20, 2000.
Decided Jan. 31, 2001.
Director of Motor Vehicles imposed insurance surcharge on Pennsylvania
motorist, resulting from his third conviction for driving while
intoxicated (DWI), and motorist appealed. The Superior Court,
Appellate Division, Lintner, J.A.D., held that non-resident driver
convicted of DWI in New Jersey is subject to insurance surcharge, even
though he is not licensed in New Jersey.
Affirmed.
**313 *54 Scott F. Wnuck, appellant pro se.
John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney for respondent
(Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Sue
Kleinberg, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Before Judges BAIME, CARCHMAN and LINTNER.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LINTNER, J.A.D.
Defendant appeals the imposition of a surcharge by the Director of
Motor Vehicles (the Director), resulting from defendant's third
conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI). N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.
Defendant was convicted of DWI on August 19, 1998, in Hackettstown
Municipal Court. Defendant's driving privileges were suspended for ten
years, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3), and he was surcharged in accordance
with N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(1)(a). He contends that as a Pennsylvania
resident he is not subject to the insurance surcharge associated with
his conviction. We disagree and hold that a non-resident driver,
convicted of a violation of **314 N.J.S .A. 39:4-50, though not
licensed in New Jersey, is subject to an insurance surcharge pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(1)(a).
On June 7, 1999, the Surcharge Administration Office of the Division
of Motor Vehicles advised defendant that it was aware that he disputed
the surcharge based upon =93Pennsylvania licensure and residency.=94 The
letter also informed defendant that, in order to dispute the surcharge
in question, he must provide proof *55 of residency at the time of the
violation, March 1, 1998. It listed the following items as acceptable
proof:
1. W-2 tax statements
2. Utility bills (phone/electric)
3. Mortgage/rental receipts
4. Auto insurance/registration
5. Voter registration
6. Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Driving Abstract
On July 1, 1999, defendant wrote to the Division of Motor Vehicles
(DMV) stating the following:
I am sending you what material I have as proof of my Pennsylvania
residency. Since selling my house in Pennsylvania in 1995 I have
rented a room and part of a barn at a relative's residents. I mostly
used this space for storage and to maintain residency but I do
occasionally reside there.
I must work in New Jersey as ... that is my Union's territory and that
is where the jobs ... are. I also am forced to remain in New Jersey as
the municipal judge in Hackettstown sentenced me to 540 hours of
community service and gave me one year to complete it. He has
threatened to jail me one day for every hour not completed by
September 1, 1999. I am due in court for review of my compliance on
that date. I have in the past several years used various addresses in
New Jersey as a convenience in certain matters. I also have put my
girlfriend's utility bills in my name as her credit was effectively
ruined by her ex-husband.
In the past year, I have spent nearly all my time here in New Jersey
at my girlfriend's or my father's home. I can assure you though as
soon as this community service is complete I will be trying to return
to Pennsylvania full-time.
In 1997 I had to pay taxes in New Jersey and Pennsylvania and it cost
me an additional $500, so in 1998 since after the conviction I was
stuck here anyway I ... filed in New Jersey.
Defendant also enclosed and made reference to his current driver's
licence, automobile insurance identification card, automobile
registration, which expired on June 30, 1998, and Pennsylvania
driver's abstract, all of which listed his address as 730-16 Milford
Rd., # 265, E. Stroudsburg, PA 18301.
On September 15, 1999, the Surcharge Administration Office advised
defendant:
Your response to our June 1999 request for proof of Pennsylvania
residency at the time of your March 1, 1998 =93Driving While
Intoxicated=94 violation was received and reviewed along with the
attached correspondence. However, a review of this residency
do***entation was not sufficient or specific as requested to sup****t
your *56 residency. Therefore, we have determined that the insurance
surcharge issued is valid and must be paid as billed.
Please be aware, having an out-of-state license is not always
sufficient to void payment of insurance surcharges. There is no
provision within the surcharge law that prevents the State of New
Jersey from *****sing any motorist who violated N.J.S.A. Title 39
while traveling within the boundaries of this state.
Defendant was further advised that the decision embodied in the letter
of September 15 constituted a final decision of the DMV.
Defendant essentially argues three points on appeal. He maintains that
(1) the DMV determination was inconsistent **315 with its prior
determination that defendant's 1995 conviction was not surchargeable;
(2) sufficient proof was submitted to show that he was a resident of
Pennsylvania; and (3) it is improper to impose a surcharge on persons
who are convicted of motor vehicle offenses in New Jersey even though
they reside and are licensed in another State.
It is settled that =93[a]n administrative agency's interpretation of
statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing
responsibility is ordinarily entitled to our deference.=94 In re Appeal
by Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 307 N.J.Super. 93, 102, 704 A.2d 562
(App.Div.1997); Krupp v. Board of Educ. of Union Cty. Reg. High Sch.,
278 N.J.Super. 31, 37-38, 650 A.2d 366 (App.Div.1994), certif. denied,
140 N.J. 277, 658 A.2d 301 (1995). Further, we defer to the agency's
expertise in relation to technical matters. In re Petition of Adamar
of New Jersey, Inc., 222 N.J.Super. 464, 470, 537 A.2d 704 (App.Div.
1988). Our task, which is a limited one, is to decide whether: (1) the
agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies; (2)
the record contains substantial evidence to sup****t the findings; and
(3) in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency
clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have
been made upon a showing of the relevant facts. R & R Mktg., L.L.C. v.
Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170, 175, 729 A.2d 1 (1999). Absent
arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious action, the agency's
determination must be affirmed. Ibid.
*57 We are satisfied that the determination by the Director is
factually sup****ted by defendant's own statements concerning his New
Jersey residency however, we hold that, regardless of defendant's
residency, he is subject to the insurance surcharge because he was
found guilty of DWI within our state. N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b). We have
held that N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b), which authorizes the surcharge
imposed here, =93shall apply to all drivers=94 and is chargeable to a
driver licenced by New Jersey who is convicted of DWI in the State of
New York, even though his actual residence is also in New York. In re
Edmond D. Johnson, 226 N.J.Super. 1, 7, 543 A.2d 454 (App.Div.1988).
N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(1)(a) requires that a surcharge be levied for
convictions under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 and =93for offenses committed in
other jurisdictions of a substantially similar nature.=94 N.J.S.A.
17:29A-35(b)(2). Where the surcharge is not paid, N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)
(2) authorizes the Director to suspend the driver's license. The
Director may also issue a certification to the Clerk of the Superior
Court in order to docket a judgment for the amount owed.
Defendant contends that if a surcharge can be imposed on a nonresident
licenced by another state then there would be no limit upon whom a
surcharge could be levied. He argues, for example, that such a broad
interpretation would permit New Jersey to impose a surcharge for a
violation that occurs in Kansas by a licensed resident of Wyoming.
Defendant's arguments are misplaced.
Generally, the wisdom, prudence and good sense of the Legislature in
the enactment of law are not questions for the judiciary to resolve.
Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 95, 248 A.2d 521 (1968). =93[I]t is
in***bent upon [us] to interpret and enforce the legislative will as
written ... not in accordance with some unexpressed and ephemeral
intention.=94 Gallagher v. Mayor and Council of the Town of Irvington,
184 N.J.Super. 225, 234, 445 A.2d 477 (Law Div.1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 190 N.J.Super. 394, 463 A.2d 969 (App.Div.1983). The cardinal
rule which applies is that statutory language should be given its
ordinary meaning *58 and construed in a common sense manner to further
the legislative purpose. N.E.R.I. Corp. v. New Jersey Highway Auth.,
147 N.J. 223, 236, 686 A.2d 328 (1996). The spirit of the law must
control the letter where a literal **316 rendering will lead to a
result that is not in accord with the purpose and the design of the
act. New Jersey Builders, Owners and Managers Ass'n v. Blair, 60 N.J.
330, 288 A.2d 855 (1972).
In order to carry out the purpose of the legislation and afford common
sense to the statutory provisions which require surcharges on =93all
drivers=94 who are convicted of violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 in New
Jersey or similar offenses in other jurisdictions, we conclude, that
the intent of the Legislature was to limit surcharges to holders of
New Jersey driver's licenses only where the DWI convictions occurs in
another state.
[10] Headnote Citing References The provisions of Interstate Driver
License Compact N.J.S.A. 39:5D-1 to -14 (the Compact) are relevant to
the resolution of the issue before us. The Compact gives the Director
the power to suspend the New Jersey driver's license even though the
license holder has been found guilty of DWI in another state. N.J.S.A.
39:5D-4. Under provisions of the Compact, the =93home state=94 is the
state that issues the license permitting operation, not the state of
residence. N.J.S.A. 39:5D-2. The provisions further prevent a driver
from obtaining driver's licenses in more then one state. N.J.S.A.
39:5D-5. Therefore, those states that have enacted the Compact can
assume that, when a licensed driver from another state is convicted of
DWI within its jurisdiction, the home state of the driver will issue
the necessary suspension in compliance with the laws of the home
state. In re Johnson, supra, 226 N.J.Super. at 4, 543 A.2d 454. Our
determination that the provision of N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b), which
requires the imposition of a surcharge for DWI convictions in New
Jersey, applies to any driver, whereas the provision imposing a
surcharge for DWI convictions in other jurisdictions is limited to
licenced New Jersey drivers, is consistent with the provisions of the
Compact.
*59 We observed in In re Johnson, supra, 226 N.J.Super. 1, 543 A.2d
454, that the purpose of the statute creating the surcharge was to
place the added cost of insurance generated by poor driving on the
high risk driver. An accident that occurs as the result of poor
driving by a New Jersey licensed driver will result in increased
insurance premiums whether the accident occurs in New Jersey or a
sister state. By contrast, a nonresident driver who is not the holder
of a New Jersey license can only adversely affect insurance costs if
the driver's poor driving results in an accident in New Jersey. Thus,
the purpose of the Legislature is served by (1) imposing a surcharge
on those found guilty of DWI in New Jersey regardless of whether they
are licensed by, or reside in, New Jersey; and (2) limiting the
imposition of a surcharge to holders of New Jersey driver's licenses
where the DWI conviction occurs in a sister state. The enforcement
provisions of N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b), which allow the Director to
suspend a New Jersey driver's license or docket a judgment, are
consistent with this purpose as well.
Affirmed.
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