Construction and application of Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments

88 A.L.R.5th 545

American Law Re****ts

ALR5th

Annotation

CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION ACT

Jay M. Zitter, J.D.

Enforcing money judgments across state borders is hard enough for
creditors to accomplish, but when the judgment to be recognized is one
of a foreign country, the difficulties are compounded. The purpose of
the codification of the common law in the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act is to provide a uniform mechanism for the
recognition of foreign country money judgments in the same manner as
judgments of sister states. In La Societe Anonyme Goro v. Conveyor
Accessories, Inc., 286 Ill. App. 3d 867, 222 Ill. Dec. 217, 677 N.E.2d
30, 88 A.L.R.5th 813 (2d Dist. 1997), an action to enforce a French
judgment under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act,
the court held that an amended seven-year limitations period for
enforcing state judgments, which applied to the enforcement of sister
state judgments under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act, also applied to the registration and enforcement of the instant
foreign country judgment, which was final and conclusive between the
parties. Other courts have dealt with various asserted reasons for the
recognition or nonrecognition of foreign country judgments, and other
interpretations of the Uniform Act, as the following annotation
illustrates.

INDEX

Abu Dhabi, judgment of Abu Dhabi court, =A7 23

Agreement between parties, foreign court proceeding contrary to
agreement between parties, =A7 22

Appeal, stay in case of appeal, =A7 25

Applicability, generally, =A7 =A7 5-14

Arbitration, award with exequatur as foreign judgment, =A7 8

Arbitration, no pre-emption by Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, =A7 4

Argentina, judgment of Argentine courts, =A7 26[b]

Australia, judgments of Australian courts, =A7 =A7 9[b], 16[b], 17[b], 18,
19[b], 22[b]

Austria, judgment of Austrian court, =A7 16[a]

Background, =A7 2[a]

Belgium, Belgian court judgments, =A7 =A7 7, 10, 19[b], 21, 22[b], 23, 25,
26[a]

Canada, judgments of Canadian courts, =A7 =A7 10, 13[a], 15, 16, 17 [a],
18, 19[b], 21, 22[b], 23

Child sup****t, definition of foreign judgment as excluding sister-
state judgment for child sup****t, =A7 11

Comity, principle of comity, =A7 =A7 7, 9[a], 11, 19[a], 26

Conflicting judgments, optional non-recognition, =A7 20

Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, no pre-
emption by, =A7 4

Costs, award of costs to law firm as not fine or penalty excluded from
definition of final judgment, =A7 10

Cuba, judgments of Cuban courts, =A7 =A7 11, 26[a]

Curacao, judgments of Curacaon courts, =A7 =A7 13, 16[b], 19[b]

Declaration of non-liability as foreign judgment for sum of money, =A7
9[a]

Defense of settlement to enforceability, =A7 32

Definitions, =A7 =A7 5-14

Degree of enforcement, =A7 33

Due process, lack of due process as basis for non-conclusive status, =A7
15

Due process, notice and hearing requirements, =A7 3

Enforceability, special requirement of enforceability and final and
conclusive judgment, =A7 14

Enforcement, generally, =A7 =A7 27-34

England, judgment of English courts, =A7 =A7 9[a], 13[a], 14[a], 15 [b],
16[b], 17[b], 18, 19, 21, 22[b], 23, 24, 26 [a], 29, 32, 33

Exequatur, arbitration award with exequatur as foreign judgment, =A7 8

Family matters, definition of foreign judgment as excluding judgment
for sup****t in matrimonial or family matters, =A7 =A7 2[a], 8, 11

Final and conclusive judgment, =A7 =A7 13, 14

Fine or penalty, definition of foreign judgment as excluding judgment
for fine or other penalty, =A7 =A7 2[a], 8, 10

Foreign judgment, definition, =A7 =A7 2[a], 8-12

Foreign state, definition, =A7 =A7 2[a], 5-7

Forum, seriously inconvenient forum and optional non-recognition, =A7 22

France, judgments of French courts, =A7 =A7 17[a], 30

Fraud, judgment and obtained by fraud and optional non-recognition, =A7
18

Full proof, absence of full proof of foreign judgment, =A7 31

Germany, judgments of German courts, =A7 =A7 8, 27

Great Britain, judgment of English courts, =A7 =A7 9[a], 13[a], 14[a],
15[b], 16[b], 17[b], 18, 19, 21, 22[b], 23, 24, 26[a], 29, 32, 33

Hearing, requirement of hearing to enforce judgment, =A7 29

Hearing and notice requirements of foreign country, =A7 3

Impartial tribunal, lack of impartial tribunal as basis for non-
conclusive status, =A7 15

Inadequate notice, inadequate notice and optional non-recognition, =A7
17

Inconvenient forum, seriously inconvenient forum and optional non-
recognition, =A7 22

India, judgments of Indian courts, =A7 =A7 15[b], 16[b], 19[b], 21

Indian reservation, enforceability within, =A7 34

Indian tribal court judgments, =A7 7

Introduction to annotation, =A7 1

Iran, judgment by Iranian tribunal, =A7 15[a]

Israel, judgment by Israel court, =A7 =A7 11, 31

Issues, effect of pleading issues rather than moving for enforcement
of judgment, =A7 28

Japan, judgments of Japanese courts, =A7 =A7 13[b], 16[b], 26[b]

Judgment, definition of foreign judgment, =A7 =A7 2[a], 8-12

Judicial settlement as foreign country judgment, =A7 8

Jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction as basis for non-
conclusive status, =A7 16

Jurisdiction, necessity of securing jurisdiction over defendant in
forum, =A7 27

Korea, judgments of Korean courts, =A7 =A7 11, 26[a]

Letters rogatory, =A7 31

Liability, declaration of non-liability as foreign judgment for sum of
money, =A7 9[a]

Libel, non-recognition based on expansive libel provisions repugnant
to public policy, =A7 19[a]

Liberia, judgment of Liberian court, =A7 15[a]

Limitations, applicability of limitations period applicable to
enforcement of foreign state judgments, =A7 30

Matrimonial matters, definition of foreign judgment as excluding
judgment for sup****t in matrimonial or family matters, =A7 =A7 2[a], 8, 11

Mexico, judgment of Mexican courts, =A7 =A7 19[a], 20[a]

Netherlands, judgment of Dutch court, =A7 =A7 20, 21

Non-conclusive status, basis for, =A7 =A7 15, 16

Non-liability, declaration of non-liability as foreign judgment for
sum of money, =A7 9[a]

Non-recognition, grounds for, =A7 =A7 15-24

Non-recognition, optional non-recognition, =A7 =A7 17-24

Notice, inadequate notice and optional non-recognition, =A7 17

Notice and hearing requirements, =A7 3

Nullification of contract, judgment nullifying contract as not foreign
judgment involving sum of money, =A7 9[b]

Optional non-recognition, =A7 =A7 17-24

Other judgments, Act as not precluding recognition of judgments not
covered by Act, =A7 26

Pacific islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, =A7 =A7 2[a], 5

Panama Canal Zone, =A7 =A7 2[a], 5

Penalties, definition of foreign judgment as excluding judgment for
fine or other penalty, =A7 =A7 2[a], 8, 10

Personal jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction as basis for non-
conclusive status, =A7 16

Pleading issues rather than moving for enforcement of judgment, effect
of, =A7 28

Practice pointers, =A7 2[b]

Pre-emption by Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards, =A7 4

Process, invalid process and final and conclusive judgment, =A7 14[b]

Proof, absence of full proof of foreign judgment, =A7 31

Public policy, repugnance to public policy and optional non-
recognition, =A7 19

Reciprocity, non-reciprocity by foreign country and optional non-
recognition, =A7 23

Reciprocity, requirement of reciprocity agreement for foreign state, =A7
5

Related annotations, =A7 1[b]

Repugnance to public policy, repugnance to public policy and optional
non- recognition, =A7 19

Rogatory, letters, =A7 31

Romania, judgments of Romanian courts, =A7 =A7 9[b], 13[a], 15[b]

Ryukyu Islands, =A7 =A7 2[a], 5

Savings clause of Act, =A7 =A7 2[a], 26

Scope of annotation, =A7 1[a]

Sequestration of assets, judgment sequestering assets as not foreign
judgment involving sum of money, =A7 9[b]

Settlement, defense of settlement to enforceability, =A7 32

Settlement, judicial settlement as foreign country judgment, =A7 8

Sister state judgments, foreign judgment as precluding sister state
judgments, =A7 12

Sister state judgments, foreign state as precluding sister state
judgments, =A7 =A7 5, 6

Stale judgment revived by foreign court order, =A7 14[a]

Stay in case of appeal, =A7 25

Summary, =A7 2[a]

Sum of money, foreign judgments within definition of term, =A7 9

Sup****t, definition of foreign judgment as excluding judgment for
sup****t in matrimonial or family matters, =A7 =A7 2[a], 8, 11

Switzerland, judgments of Swiss courts, =A7 =A7 11, 16[a]

Taxes, definition of foreign judgment as excluding judgment for taxes,
=A7 =A7 2 [a], 8

Tonga, judgments of Tongan courts, =A7 =A7 15[b], 18

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, =A7 =A7 2[a], 5

Uncovered judgments, Act as not precluding recognition of judgments
not covered by Act, =A7 26

Undetermined amount of money, judgment for undetermined amount of
money as not foreign judgment involving sum of money, =A7 9[b]

JURISDICTIONAL TABLE OF CITED STATUTES AND CASES

UNITED STATES

U.S.C.A. Const Amend XIV. See =A7 15[b]

9 U.S.C.A. =A7=A7 201 et seq. See =A7 4

28 U.S.C.A. =A7 1738B(b). See =A7 7

50 U.S.C.A. =A7=A7 1 et seq. See =A7 19[b]

Biggelaar v. Wagner, 978 F. Supp. 848--=A7 20[b]

Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134--=A7 15[a]

Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Hoffman, 665 F. Supp. 73--=A7 10

International Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Refiomontana,
S.A. de C.V., 277 F. Supp. 2d 670--=A7 24

Society of Lloyd's v. Estate of McMurray, 274 F.3d 1133--=A7 26.5

Society of Lloyd's v. Mullin, 255 F. Supp. 2d 468--=A7=A7 18, 19[b]

Society of Lloyds, The v Society of Lloyds v. Webb, 156 F. Supp. 2d
632--=A7=A7 15[b], 19[b]

Van Kooten Holding B.V. v. Dumarco Corp., 670 F. Supp. 227--=A7 5

ARIZONA

Alberta Securities Com'n v. Ryckman, 30 P.3d 121--=A7=A7 13[a], 15[b]

CALIFORNIA

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code =A7=A7 1713-1713.8. See =A7 15[a]

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code =A7 1713.4 subd. (b)(3). See =A7 19[a]

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code =A7 1713.4 subd. (b)(4). See =A7 20[a]

Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406 (applying California law)--=A7
15 [a]

Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243--=A7 16[b]

Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243 (applying California
law)--=A7=A7 2[b], 18, 22[b]

Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 612 F.2d 467 (applying California law)--=A7=A7
7, 16[b]

Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796--=A7=A7 2[b], 16
[a]

Korea Water Resources Corp. v. Lee, 115 Cal. App. 4th 389, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 853--=A7 13[b]

Pentz v. Kuppinger, 31 Cal. App. 3d 590, 107 Cal. Rptr. 540--=A7=A7 2[b],
19[a], 20[a]

Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Redstar Corp., 20 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 603--=A7 27

Stevens v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 3d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 369--=A7=A7
6, 25

COLORADO

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. =A7 13-62-102(1). See =A7=A7 7, 26[a]

Milhoux v. Linder, 902 P.2d 856--=A7=A7 7, 26[a]

CONNECTICUT

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. =A7 50a-31(1). See =A7=A7 5, 6

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. =A7 52-614(a)(1). See =A7 15[b]

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. =A7 52-614(b)(2). See =A7 18

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. =A7 52-614(b)(5). See =A7 21

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. =A7 52-615. See =A7 16[b]

Bank of New York v. Cocozza, 1991 WL 225148--=A7 6

Brannick v. Genova, 1991 WL 28035--=A7=A7 2[b], 6, 16[b]

Compass Bank for Savings v. Katz, 1997 WL 139398--=A7=A7 5, 6

Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Nielson, 1991 WL 85151--=A7=A7 5, 6

Fiske, Emery & Associates v. Ajello, 41 Conn. Supp. 376, 577 A.2d
1139--=A7=A7 2[b], 15[b], 18, 21

Hilton Intern. of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Pacific, 1992 WL 66559--=A7=A7 5, 6

FLORIDA

Fla. Stat. Ann. =A7=A7 55.601-55.607. See =A7 30

Le Credit Lyonnais, S.A. v. Nadd, 741 So. 2d 1165--=A7 30

Nadd v. Le Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 804 So. 2d 1226--=A7 26.5

Nicor Intern. Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1357, R.I.C.O.
Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) =B6 10593 (applying Florida law)--=A7 15.5

GEORGIA

Ga. Code Ann. =A7 110-1301(b). See =A7=A7 5, 6, 11, 26[a]

Ga. Code Ann. =A7 110-1304. See =A7=A7 5, 6

Jacoby v. Jacoby, 150 Ga. App. 725, 258 S.E.2d 534--=A7=A7 5, 6, 11

Knothe v. Rose, 195 Ga. App. 7, 392 S.E.2d 570--=A7=A7 11, 26[a]

Kronitz v. Fifth Ave. Dance Studio, Inc., 242 Ga. 398, 249 S.E.2d 80--
=A7=A7 5, 6

HAWAII

Haw. Rev. Stat. =A7 658C-8. See =A7 26[a]

Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 658C. See =A7 26[a]

Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Haw. 91, 969 P.2d 1209--=A7 26[a]

IDAHO

G & R Petroleum, Inc. v. Clements, 127 Idaho 119, 898 P.2d 50--=A7 5

ILLINOIS

735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-618. See =A7 9[b]

735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-618 et seq. See =A7=A7 11, 15[a], 16 [b],
17[a, b], 18, 19[b], 22[b]

735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-618(b). See =A7=A7 9[a], 26[a]

735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-620. See =A7 30

735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-621. See =A7=A7 5, 6, 15[b], 21

735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-621(b)(3). See =A7=A7 19[a], 20[a]

735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-621(b)(4). See =A7=A7 19[a], 20[a]

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, =A7 12-621(b)(5). See =A7 22[b]

Act Metal Fabricating Co. v. Arvid C. Walberg & Co., 135 Ill. App. 3d
452, 90 Ill. Dec. 266, 481 N.E.2d 1066--=A7=A7 5, 6

Bianchi v. Savino Del Bene Intern. Freight Forwarders, Inc., 329 Ill.
App. 3d 908, 264 Ill. Dec. 379, 770 N.E.2d 684--=A7 24

Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680 (applying Illinois
law)-- =A7=A7 19[b], 21, 22[b], 25

La Societe Anonyme Goro v. Conveyor Accessories, Inc., 286 Ill. App.
3d 867, 222 Ill. Dec. 217, 677 N.E.2d 30, 88 A.L.R.5th 813--=A7 30

Nardi v. Segal, 90 Ill. App. 2d 432, 234 N.E.2d 805--=A7=A7 11, 26[a]

Osario v. Harza Engineering Co., 890 F. Supp. 750 (applying Illinois
law)-- =A7 31

Philips Electronics, N.V. v. New Hamp****re Ins. Co., 295 Ill. App. 3d
895, 230 Ill. Dec. 102, 692 N.E.2d 1268--=A7=A7 9[a], 26[a]

Pinilla v. Harza Engineering Co., 257 Ill. Dec. 921, 755 N.E.2d 23--=A7
26.5

Pinnacle Arabians, Inc. v. Schmidt, 274 Ill. App. 3d 504, 210 Ill.
Dec. 963, 654 N.E.2d 262--=A7=A7 16[b], 18

Salisbury Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Carpenter, 131 Ill. App. 3d 829,
86 Ill. Dec. 839, 476 N.E.2d 15--=A7=A7 2[b], 5, 6, 17[b]

Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473 (applying Illinois law)--
=A7 15[b]

Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Woodstock, Inc., 34 Ill. App. 3d 86,
339 N.E.2d 423--=A7=A7 6, 22[b]

Van Kooten Holding B.V. v. Dumarco Corp., 670 F. Supp. 227 (applying
Illinois law)--=A7 6

Vrozos v. Sarantopoulos, 195 Ill. App. 3d 610, 142 Ill. Dec. 352, 552
N.E.2d 1093--=A7=A7 2[b], 15[a], 16[a], 17[a]

World Granite and Marble Corp. v. Wil-Freds Const., Inc., 1996 WL
763230 (applying Illinois law)--=A7=A7 2[b], 9[b], 19[a], 20[a]

Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill. App. 3d 849, 4 Ill. Dec. 450, 360 N.E.
2d 386--=A7=A7 11, 26[a]

INDIANA

Biggelaar v. Wagner, 978 F. Supp. 848 (applying Indiana law)--=A7 21

IOWA

Iowa Code Ann. ch. 626B. See =A7 12

Eagle Leasing v. Amandus, 476 N.W.2d 35--=A7 12

KANSAS

Elkhart Co-op. Equity Exchange v. Hicks, 16 Kan. App. 2d 336, 823 P.2d
223-- =A7 6

MARYLAND

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. =A7 10-701(c). See =A7 5

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. =A7 10-702. See =A7 32

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. =A7 10-703. See =A7 32

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. =A7 10-704. See =A7 19[b]

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. =A7 10-704(b)(2). See =A7 19[a]

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. =A7=A7 10:701 et seq. See =A7 24

Andes v. Versant Corp., 878 F.2d 147 (applying Maryland law)--=A7 33

Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875 (applying Maryland law)--=A7=A7 15[b],
19[b], 24, 32

Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1367
(applying Maryland law)--=A7=A7 2[b], 19[a]

Mueller v. Payn, 30 Md. App. 377, 352 A.2d 895--=A7 5

Pitman v. Aran, 935 F. Supp. 637 (applying Maryland law)--=A7 31

Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 702 A.2d 230, 25 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2473--=A7=A7 19[a], 26[b]

Wolff v. Wolff, 40 Md. App. 168, 389 A.2d 413, 100 A.L.R.3d 779--=A7
26[a]

MASSACHUSETTS

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, =A7 93. See =A7 19[a]

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 235, =A7 23A. See =A7=A7 9[b], 10, 13[a], 14 [b],
15[a], 16[a, b], 17[a, b], 18, 19[a, b], 22 [a, b], 23

Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Hoffman, 665 F. Supp. 73 (applying
Massachusetts law)--=A7 10

Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewell, 411 Mass. 711, 585 N.E.2d 321--=A7=A7
10, 13[a]

Farrow Mortg. Services Pty. Ltd. v. Singh, 3 Mass. L. Rptr. 552, 1995
WL 809561--=A7=A7 2[b], 9[b], 16[b], 17[b], 18, 19[b], 22[b]

K & R Robinson Enterprises Ltd. v. Asian Ex****t Material Supply Co.,
Inc., 178 F.R.D. 332 (applying Massachusetts law)--=A7=A7 2[b], 14[b],
16[a, b]

Manches & Co. v. Gilbey, 419 Mass. 414, 646 N.E.2d 86--=A7=A7 15[b], 16
[b], 22[b]

McCord v. Jet Spray Intern. Corp., 874 F. Supp. 436 (applying
Massachusetts law)--=A7=A7 2[b], 19[b], 23

Pulte Computer Corp. v. Debus, 1990 Mass. App. Div. 211, 1990 WL
270770--=A7 22[b]

Titan PRT Systems, Inc. v. Fabian, 6 Mass. L. Rptr. 345, 1997 WL
27120--=A7=A7 2[b], 6, 15[a], 16[a], 17[a], 19[a], 22[a]

MICHIGAN

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. =A7 691.1151(b). See =A7=A7 11, 26[a]

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. =A7=A7 691.1151, 691.1153. See =A7=A7 13[a], 15[b],
19[b]

Dart v. Dart, 224 Mich. App. 146, 568 N.W.2d 353--=A7=A7 2[b], 13[a],
15[b], 19[b]

Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Company, Ltd., 260 Mich.
App. 144, 677 N.W.2d 874--=A7 13[a]

Jeong Suk Bang v. Joon Hong Park, 116 Mich. App. 34, 321 N.W.2d 831--
=A7=A7 11, 26[a]

Peters Production, Inc. v. Desnick Broadcasting Co., 171 Mich. App.
283, 429 N.W.2d 654--=A7 5

MONTANA

Mont. Code Ann. =A7=A7 25-9-601 et seq. See =A7 34

Mont. Code Ann. =A7 25-9-602(1, 2). See =A7 7

Anderson v. Engelke, 1998 MT 24, 287 Mont. 283, 954 P.2d 1106--=A7 34

Day v. State Dept. of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Child
Sup****t Enforcement Div., 272 Mont. 170, 900 P.2d 296--=A7 7

NEW JERSEY

Kam-Tech Systems Ltd. v. Yardeni, 340 N.J. Super. 414, 774 A.2d 644--
=A7=A7 3, 13[a], 15[b], 16[b], 18

NEW MEXICO

Jordan v. Hall, 115 N.M. 775, 858 P.2d 863--=A7 5

NEW YORK

N.Y. Const. art. I, =A7 8. See =A7 19[a]

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301(b). See =A7 9[b]

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301, 5303. See =A7 8

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5302. See =A7=A7 8, 13[a]

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5303. See =A7=A7 11, 27, 28

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304. See =A7=A7 13[a], 14[a], 15[b], 16[b], 17 [b], 18, 21

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(a). See =A7=A7 15[a, b], 16[b]

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(4). See =A7 19[a, b]

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(6). See =A7 21

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(7). See =A7 22[b]

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5305. See =A7=A7 16[b], 18

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5305(a)(3). See =A7 16[b]

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5305(a)(5). See =A7 16[a]

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5305(b). See =A7 16[b]

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 962 F. Supp.
420 (applying New York law)--=A7 9[b]

Attorney General of Canada v. Gorman, 769 N.Y.S.2d 369--=A7 16[a]

Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications Inc., 154 Misc. 2d 228, 585
N.Y.S.2d 661--=A7 19[a]

Biel v. Boehm, 94 Misc. 2d 946, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231--=A7 27

CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp. N.V., 743 N.Y.S.2d 408--=A7=A7
15 [b], 16[b], 20[b], 22[b]

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Saxony Carpet Co., Inc., 899 F.
Supp. 1248 (applying New York law)--=A7=A7 2[b], 16[b]

Colonial Bank v. Worms, 550 F. Supp. 55 (applying New York law)--=A7=A7 2
[b], 15[b], 19[b], 22[b]

Dresdner Bank AG (New York Branch) v. Edelmann, 129 Misc. 2d 686, 493
N.Y.S.2d 703--=A7 28

Dynamic Cassette Intern. Ltd. v. Mike Lopez & Associates, Inc., 923 F.
Supp. 8 (applying New York law)--=A7=A7 15[b], 16[b]

Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co.,
Ltd., 470 F. Supp. 610 (applying New York law)--=A7=A7 16[b], 18

Gondre v. Silberstein, 744 F. Supp. 429 (applying New York law)--=A7=A7 2
[b], 17[a]

Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313
(applying New York law)--=A7=A7 4, 13[a, b], 16[b], 19[b]

J. G. Mailaender Druckmaschinenfabrik GmbH & Co. K. G. v. Otto
Isenschmid Corp., 88 A.D.2d 654, 450 N.Y.S.2d 533--=A7 8

Mandel-Mantello v. Treves, 103 Misc. 2d 700, 426 N.Y.S.2d 929--=A7 11

Mandel-Mantello v. Treves, 79 A.D.2d 569, 434 N.Y.S.2d 29--=A7 11

National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. People's Republic
of the Congo, 729 F. Supp. 936 (applying New York law)--=A7=A7 17[b], 18

New Central Jute Mills Co. v. City Trade and Industries, Limited, 65
Misc. 2d 653, 318 N.Y.S.2d 980--=A7=A7 15[b], 16[b], 17[b], 18, 19[b], 21

Nippon Emo-Trans Co., Ltd. v. Emo-Trans, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1215
(applying New York law)--=A7=A7 2[b], 16[b]

Ocean Warehousing B.V. v. Baron Metals and Alloys, Inc., 157 F. Supp.
2d 245--=A7 13[a]

Overseas Development Bank In Liquidation v. Nothmann, 115 A.D.2d 719,
496 N.Y.S.2d 534--=A7 14[a]

Overseas Development Bank in Liquidation v. Nothmann, 103 A.D.2d 534,
480 N.Y.S.2d 735--=A7 14[a]

****isini v. Petricca, 90 A.D.2d 949, 456 N.Y.S.2d 888--=A7=A7 16[b], 18

S.C. Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enterprises Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206--=A7=A7
13 [a], 15[b]

Seetrans****t Wiking Trader Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co.,
Kommanditgesellschaft v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 29 F.3d 79
(applying New York law)--=A7 8

Siedler v. Jacobson, 86 Misc. 2d 1010, 383 N.Y.S.2d 833--=A7=A7 2[b], 16
[a]

Soloman Ltd. v. Biederman and Co., Inc., 177 A.D.2d 350, 576 N.Y.S.2d
118-- =A7=A7 2[b], 16[b]

Van Den Bogaerde v. Staub, Warmbold & Associates Intern., Inc., 80 A.D.
2d 517, 435 N.Y.S.2d 736--=A7 21

Wimmer Canada, Inc. v. Abele Tractor & Equipment Co., Inc., 750 N.Y.S.
2d 331--=A7 27

OKLAHOMA

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, =A7 710. See =A7 5

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, =A7 713. See =A7 16[b]

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, =A7 714. See =A7 16[b]

Marriage of Grant, In re, 1998 OK CIV APP 127, 964 P.2d 963--=A7=A7 5, 6

Ross v. Brewer, 1991 OK CIV APP 6, 805 P.2d 133--=A7=A7 5, 6, 16[b]

Willhite v. Willhite, 1976 OK 17, 546 P.2d 612--=A7 5

PENNSYLVANIA

Society of Lloyd's v. Mullin, 96 Fed. Appx. 100 (applying Pennsylvania
law)--=A7=A7 15[b], 19[b]

TEXAS

Tex. Rev. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. =A7 35.004. See =A7 3

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2328b-6, =A7 5(b)(2). See =A7=A7 18, 19[b]

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2328b-6, =A7 5(b)(7). See =A7 23

Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000 (applying
Texas law)--=A7=A7 2[b], 23

Courage Co., L.L.C., The v Courage Co., L.L.C. v. The Chemshare Corp.,
93 S.W.3d 323--=A7 15.5

Detamore v. Sullivan, 731 S.W.2d 122--=A7=A7 3, 29

Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enterprises, Ltd., 794 S.W.2d
760--=A7 3

Hennessy v. Marshall, 682 S.W.2d 340--=A7 29

Hernandez v. Seventh Day Adventist Corp., Ltd., 54 S.W.3d 335--=A7 13[a]

Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 580 F. Supp. 304 (applying
Texas law)--=A7=A7 21, 23

Norkan Lodge Co. Ltd. v. Gillum, 587 F. Supp. 1457 (applying Texas
law)--=A7=A7 2[b], 18, 19[b], 23

Plastics Engineering Inc. v. Diamond Plastics Corp., 764 S.W.2d 924--=A7
3

Society of Lloyd's v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325 (applying Texas law)--=A7
19[b]

WA****NGTON

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. =A7 6.40.010(2). See =A7 11

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. =A7 6.40.040(2)(b). See =A7 18

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. =A7 6.40.040(2)(e). See =A7 21

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. =A7 6.40.040(2)(f). See =A7 22[b]

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. =A7 6.40.070. See =A7=A7 13[b], 26[b]

Bank of Nova Scotia v. Tschabold Equipment Ltd., 51 Wash. App. 749,
754 P.2d 1290--=A7=A7 15[b], 18, 19[b], 21, 22[b]

Mayekawa Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Sasaki, 76 Wash. App. 791, 888 P.2d 183--=A7=A7
13 [b], 26[b]

Rains v. State, Dept. of Social and Health Services, Div. of Child
Sup****t, 98 Wash. App. 127, 989 P.2d 558--=A7 11

Tonga Air Services, Ltd. v. Fowler, 118 Wash. 2d 718, 826 P.2d 204--=A7=A7
15 [b], 18

ARTICLE

I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS

=A7 1. Introduction

[a] Scope

This annotation [FN1] collects and analyzes the state and federal
cases construing or applying the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act, [FN2] which provides for the conclusive recognition
of certain money judgments rendered by the courts of foreign nations.
[FN3]

A number of jurisdictions may have rules, regulations, constitutional
provisions, or Uniform Act or other legislative enactments directly
bearing on this subject. These provisions are discussed herein only to
the extent that they are reflected in the court opinions that fall
within the scope of this annotation. The reader is consequently
advised to consult the appropriate statutory or regulatory
compilations to ascertain the current status of all statutes discussed
herein, including those listed in the Jurisdictional Table of Cited
Statutes and Cases.

[b] Related annotations

Full faith and credit "last-in-time" rules as applicable to sister
state divorce or custody judgment which is inconsistent with the forum
state's earlier judgment. 36 ALR5th 527.

Validity, construction, and application of Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act. 31 ALR4th 706.

Judgment of court of foreign country as entitled to enforcement or
extraterritorial effect in state court. 13 ALR4th 1109.

Requirement of full faith and credit to foreign judgment for punitive
damages. 44 ALR3d 960.

Domestic recognition of divorce decree obtained in foreign country and
attacked for lack of domicil or jurisdiction of parties. 13 ALR3d
1419.

Conflict of laws as to time limitations governing action on foreign
judgment. 36 ALR2d 567.

Decree for alimony rendered in another state or country (or domestic
decree based thereon) as subject to enforcement by equitable remedies
or by contempt proceedings. 18 ALR2d 862.

Refusal to Enforce Foreign Arbitration Awards on Public Policy
Grounds. 144 ALR Fed 481.

Construction and application of Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C.A. =A7
1350), providing for federal jurisdiction over alien's action for tort
committed in violation of law of nations or treaty of United States.
116 ALR Fed 387.

Valid judgment of court of foreign country as entitled to
extraterritorial effect in Federal District Court. 13 ALR Fed 208.

=A7 2. Background, summary, and comment

[a] Generally

The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act was approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association, in 1962. The Act codifies, rather than
changes, the common law as applied by the majority of courts in the
United States. [FN4] The purpose of the Act is to make it more likely
that judgments rendered in a state that adopted the Act will be
recognized abroad, since in a large number of civil-law countries, the
granting of conclusive effect to money judgments from foreign courts
is made dependent on reciprocity. [FN5]

The basic mechanism of the Act provides that foreign country money
judgments will be recognized by the forum state, assuming that the
judgment meets a fair number of basic criteria. These requirements
balance each state's desire to enforce only those judgments that
accord with its own specific laws, with the understanding that the
world contains many different cultures and legal systems, whose
judicial decisions and legislative enactments may be completely unlike
American court determinations and state statutes and regulations, but
that court rulings emanating therefrom may nonetheless be worthy of
recognition.

A few courts have addressed general questions about the validity of
the Act and its provisions. For instance, a court has held that
although the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which
made foreign country money judgments enforceable in the same manner as
judgments of sister states, did not contain express provisions as to
notice to the defendant of the recognition proceedings, a judgment
creditor's common-law suit brought to recognize a Canadian judgment
complied with due process requirements of notice and hearing ( =A7 3).
Another court has held that the Act was not preempted by federal law
implementing the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards ( =A7 4).

The Act in =A7 1(a) defines a "foreign state" as any governmental unit
other than the United States, or any state, district, commonwealth,
territory, insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the Ryukyu Islands. Some
courts have held that this definition absolutely precludes an
application of the Act to judgments of sister states ( =A7 5), while
other courts, without ruling directly on such issue, have construed
provisions of the Act in actions involving sister state judgments ( =A7
6). A special state definition of the term "foreign state" in the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act provides that a
foreign country was required to have entered into a reciprocal
agreement with the United States to come within the Act. Under such
provision, it has been held that since Belgium did not have such an
agreement with the United States, a state court was not required to
recognize a Belgian judgment under the Act ( =A7 7).

A "foreign judgment" is defined by =A7 1(b) of the Act as any judgment
of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money,
other than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a
judgment for sup****t in matrimonial or family matters. In construing
this provision, a number of courts have found that particular foreign
court actions, such as consent judgments, although they were arguably
not within the scope of such term, constituted "judgments" that could
be recognized under the Act ( =A7 8). A number of courts have held that
foreign country judgments were not enforceable in state courts under
the Uniform Act, =A7 1(b), defining an enforceable "foreign country
judgment" as one involving recovery of a "a sum of money," where the
judgments in question allegedly merely performed such actions as
nullifying a contract or sequestering assets and did not actually
award money, or where the amount was not specified ( =A7 9[b]), although
another court has held that where a number of insurers brought an
action in a British court for a declaration that they were not liable
to a cor****ation on certain policies, a judgment in this matter by the
English court would be a "foreign judgment" under the Uniform Act's
definition of "foreign judgment" as any judgment of a foreign State
granting or denying recovery of a "sum of money" ( =A7 9[a]). Other
courts have ruled that since particular foreign judgments were
remedial in nature and not punitive, they were not within the
exclusion of being a "fine or penalty" and thus were subject to
recognition under the Act ( =A7 10). Still other courts have found that
particular judgments involved the sup****t provisions of foreign
matrimonial decrees and thus were specifically excepted and
unenforceable ( =A7 11). And yet another court has found that
application of the Uniform Act to "foreign judgments" is limited to
judgments obtained in the courts of foreign countries, not those
obtained in other states ( =A7 12).

The Act, in =A7 2 thereof, specifically applies to any foreign judgment
that is final, conclusive, and enforceable where rendered, even though
an appeal therefrom is pending or the judgment is subject to appeal.
In this context, some courts have held that a foreign judgment entered
on a foreign award was "final and conclusive" under =A7 2 of the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, despite such factors as the
judgment being subject to change because the award left it open to
either party to demand further arbitration and possibly to obtain
further and more extensive damages ( =A7 13[a]). On the other hand, a
different court has held that a judgment obtained against a Japanese
cor****ation in Japan was not enforceable under the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act where the judgment, although presently
enforceable in Japan, was not "final" but "preliminary" under Japanese
law because an objection to it had been filed ( =A7 13[b]). And under a
state's particular version of the Act requiring a foreign judgment to
be "final, conclusive and enforceable" to be recognized, another court
has held that two English default money judgments based on guarantee
agreements would be recognized as being "enforceable" in England
pursuant to a special English court order of the High Court of
Justice, Queen's Bench Division, even though the judgments were
ordinarily stale since seven years had passed before the state
proceeding was brought ( =A7 14[a]). On the other hand, where a judgment
creditor brought suit against the judgment debtors to domesticate
default judgments obtained in British Columbia under the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Act, a court has held that the evidence raised
a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the creditor effectively
served the debtors under either Massachusetts or British Columbia law,
precluding summary judgment, because the judgment was not "enforceable
where rendered" as required by the Act ( =A7 14 [b]).

The Act in =A7 4 sets forth specific grounds that, when found, justify a
court's nonrecognition of a foreign money judgment. Subsection (a)(1)
provides that a foreign judgment is not conclusive if the judgment was
rendered under a system that does not provide impartial tribunals or
procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law. In
this connection a court ruled that an Iranian default judgment was not
enforceable under =A7 4(a)(1) of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act against the sister of the former Shah of Iran as the
tribunal did not afford the defendant process com****ting with American
due-process requirements ( =A7 15[a]). And another court has ruled that
general due process requirements might have been violated, and thus a
foreign judgment became subject to nonrecognition, where when the
judgment was rendered there was no requirement of notice to the
defendant as to a damages hearing ( =A7 15[a]). However, a large number
of other courts have ruled that the procedures of the foreign courts,
although differing in many ways from basic American procedures, did
not so radically curtail the rights of the defendant to fairly present
his or her case so as to violate due process and render the foreign
money judgment not conclusive ( =A7 15[b]).

Subsections (a)(2, 3) provide that a foreign judgment is not
conclusive if the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, or subject matter jurisdiction. In this
connection, =A7 5 of the Act provides a non-exhaustive list of factors
sup****ting a finding of personal jurisdiction, including personal
service in the foreign state, a voluntary appearance in the foreign
state proceeding, an agreement to submit to the foreign country's
jurisdiction, domicile in that country, business connections with the
foreign country, and the defendant operating a motor vehicle or
airplane in the foreign state with the proceedings involving a claim
arising out of such use. Accordingly, in light of varying
cir***stances, some courts have held that the foreign court did not
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, thereby precluding
recognition of the foreign court money judgment ( =A7 16[a]), while
other courts have held that the foreign court did have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant and that recognition was not avoidable
on this ground ( =A7 16[b]).

Subsection (b) of =A7 4 of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act goes on to list a number of situations in which the
forum court has the option not to recognize the foreign money
judgment. Thus, =A7 4(b)(1) provides for optional nonrecognition if the
defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive
notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him or her to
defend. In this connection, while some courts have held that foreign
money judgments would not or might not be recognized under the Uniform
Act where there had been no notice given, or where no or inadequate
effort had been made to establish foreign law with respect to alleged
irregularities in the substitute service of summons ( =A7 17[a]), other
courts have rejected claims that nonrecognition was appropriate
because the notice given was inadequate ( =A7 17[b]).

Subsection 4(b)(2) of the Act specifically provides that a foreign
money judgment need not be recognized if the judgment was obtained by
fraud, although such contention has not been sustained by the courts
in the particular cir***stances of a number of cases ( =A7 18). These
courts often noted that the fraud in question must relate to matters
other than issues that could have been litigated in the foreign court
and must be a fraud on the court, and that such "extrinsic" fraud was
not presented by the record.

A court may also refuse to recognize a foreign money judgment, under
Subsection 4(b)(3)of the Act, if the cause of action or claim for
relief on which the judgment was based is repugnant to the public
policy of the forum state. Under certain cir***stances it has been
held that the cause of action on which a foreign money judgment was
based was repugnant to the public policy of the forum state, thus
warranting the nonrecognition of the judgment ( =A7 19 [a]), while under
other cir***stances, it has been held that the underlying cause of
action on which the foreign judgment was based was not repugnant to
the public policy of the forum state ( =A7 19[b]). It is to be noted
that the question of "repugnance" has been variously interpreted in
the various cases discussed in =A7 19 as referring to the general type
of claim itself, to the factors necessary to prove the claim
generally, or to the particular facts of the individual claim itself.

Subsection 4(b)(4) of the Act provides that a foreign judgment need
not be recognized if the judgment conflicts with another final and
conclusive judgment. Pursuant to this provision, it has been held in a
few cases that a foreign money judgment conflicted with another final
and conclusive judgment, and therefore was not entitled to be
recognized under =A7 4(b)(4) of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act ( =A7 20[a]). In another case, however, the court ruled
that by his actions an American defendant, who was involved in a
contractual dispute with a Dutch horse breeder, waived any claim he
might have had under the relevant sections of the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act concerning the defense to recognition
of a foreign money judgment if the judgment conflicted with another
final judgment =A7 20[b]).

Subsection 4(b)(5) of the Act provides that a foreign judgment need
not be recognized if the proceedings in the foreign court were
contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the dispute
in question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in that
court, such as by, for example, arbitration. Thus, while in one case
the court held that a foreign money judgment conflicted with another
final and conclusive judgment, and therefore was not entitled to be
recognized under =A7 4(b)(4) of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act ( =A7 21[a]), in the same case discussed earlier in =A7
20[b], the court ruled that by his actions an American defendant, who
was involved in a contractual dispute with a Dutch horse breeder,
waived any claim he might have had under the relevant sections of the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act concerning the defense
to recognition of a foreign judgment of a conflicting judgment ( =A7
21[b]).

The final ground for optional nonrecognition mentioned in the Uniform
Act is found in =A7 4(b)(6). This subsection provides that in the case
of jurisdiction based only on personal service, a foreign money
judgment need not be recognized if the foreign court was a seriously
inconvenient forum for the trial of the action. Interpreting this
provision in light of specific cir***stances, some courts have held
that the foreign court that entered the foreign money judgment was not
a seriously inconvenient forum ( =A7 22[b]), often noting that the
parties had significant contacts with the foreign country during the
formation or performance of the contract. On the other hand, one court
has held that there were questions of fact as to whether a New Jersey
money judgment based on a newsletter commentator's liability for
commercial libel against two cor****ations should be recognized under
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act based on a number
of defensive claims including New Jersey being a seriously
inconvenient forum, where the commentator only appeared to have six
subscribers in New Jersey and to derive about $750 in annual revenues
from them ( =A7 22[a]).

Some states have added some optional grounds for denying the
recognition of foreign money judgments. Thus, a few states have
enacted provisions to the effect that a foreign money judgment need
not be recognized if it is established that the foreign country in
which the judgment was rendered does not recognize judgments rendered
in the state. Under such clauses, the courts have held that it was not
shown that there was no reciprocity, so that the judgments were not
subject to nonrecognition on this ground ( =A7 23). On the other hand,
it has also been held that additional grounds for nonrecognition of
foreign country money judgments, other than those specifically
provided in the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, may
not generally be entertained by the recognition court ( =A7 24).

Section 6 of the Act provides that if the defendant satisfies the
court either that an appeal is pending or that he is entitled and
intends to appeal from the foreign judgment, the court may stay the
proceedings until the appeal has been determined or until the
expiration of a period of time sufficient to enable the defendant to
prosecute the appeal. This provision has been interpreted as
authorizing a stay of the forum state's enforcement of an earlier
foreign state's money judgment pending appellate review of the foreign
state's judgment ( =A7 25).

Section 7 of the Act, the savings clause, provides that the Act does
not prevent the recognition of a foreign money judgment in situations
not covered by the Act. Accordingly, a number of courts have ruled
that based on principles of comity and the like, certain foreign
judgments were subject to recognition, even though they did not fit
the recognition criteria under the Act ( =A7 26 [a]). However, in one
case the court held that a money judgment obtained against a Japanese
cor****ation in Japan, which was not enforceable under the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act because it was not held to be
a final judgment thereunder, was likewise not enforceable under =A7 7,
the savings clause of the Act, allowing recognition in other, not
covered situations as, under the cir***stances presented, recognition
might lead to inconsistent interpretations and enforcement of foreign
law ( =A7 26[b]).

The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act is not primarily
an enforcement act. The comment to Section 3 of the Act explains that
the language of that section, providing that a foreign judgment that
meets the criteria of the Act, "is enforceable in the same manner as
the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and
credit," meant that the method of enforcement would be that of the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, in a state having
enacted the latter Act. Nevertheless, a number of issues pertaining to
the enforcement of foreign money judgments have been raised by the
courts in construing the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act. For example, it has been held that the New York version of =A7 3 of
the Act required a party seeking to enforce a recognized foreign
country money judgment first to secure a jurisdictional basis over the
defendant in New York ( =A7 27).

Of course, a plaintiff is not required to adduce the foreign judgment--
he or she could bring a repeat cause of action in the state
jurisdiction, even though there is no need to do so because of the
existence of the foreign judgment. What is the case where the
defendant mistakenly fails to plead the foreign judgment and instead
re-pleads the cause of action? In this context, a court, construing
the particular provisions of the New York version of the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, allowing foreign country
judgments to be enforced by a number of methods, has held that a
plaintiff would be granted summary judgment to enforce a German
judgment in New York by an action on the judgment even though the
plaintiff's complaint sounded in contract, rather than as an action
for the enforcement of the foreign judgment ( =A7 28).

As to certain technical requirements of pleading so as to recognize a
foreign money judgment under the Uniform Act, some courts have ruled
that a foreign judgment would be recognized and enforced under the
Uniform Act only if a copy of the actual foreign judgment itself was
submitted, and not something less, e.g., directives to the forum court
such as letters rogatory ( =A7 31). Courts construing Texas law have
reached opposite conclusions as to whether there was a requirement
that there be a hearing to determine whether a foreign judgment should
be enforced under the Act ( =A7 29).

As to defenses to enforcement of foreign country money judgments, a
court has held that an amended seven year limitations period for
enforcing state judgments, which applied to the enforcement of sister
state judgments under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act, also applied to the registration and enforcement of the instant
foreign country judgment under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act ( =A7 30). Another court has ruled that a post-judgment
settlement was a defense in an action by a foreign country judgment
creditor to recognize and enforce the judgment in the forum, in light
of a state's specific version of the Act requiring that a recognizable
foreign judgment be "final, conclusive, and enforceable where
rendered" ( =A7 32).

A court has held that it would not give effect to an English rule of
preclusion pursuant to which a claim of secondary liability could not
be prosecuted against a party who had been made party to the
litigation against the primary obligor, and thus it ruled that the
creditor's successor, as a holder of an English money judgment against
an American cor****ate guarantor, could seek enforcement of the
judgment against the guarantor's alleged sole shareholder and alleged
successor in interest ( =A7 33). Finally, another court has held that a
state court could not enforce a tribal court money judgment within the
exterior boundaries of the Indian reservation via the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act ( =A7 34).

The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, also includes, in
=A7=A7 8- 11, a paragraph requiring the uniformity of interpretation, and
it makes provision for a short title, the repeal of other statutes,
and an effective date.

[b] Practice pointers

Proof that the service of process was invalid or did not confer
jurisdiction over the defendant can be shown where the server was not
authorized by law to serve process in a case involving a certain sum
or greater, [FN6] where there was improper substitute service,
especially as many courts strictly construe provisions allowing such
service, [FN7] or where service was made out of the jurisdiction but
without the necessary authorizing court order. [FN8] Service through
diplomatic channels may be acceptable in certain jurisdictions. [FN9]
The defendant's lack-of-notice claim may be defeated by the plaintiff
showing that, despite formal notice being inadequate or absent, the
defendant informally knew about the proceedings. [FN10] In this
context it should be noted that a general response to a relatively
common claim, that the defendant did not know of the proceeding
leading to the judgment being enforced, is that the defendant's
attorney was informed of the case. [FN11] Similarly, it can be argued
that notice was invalid, and thus personal jurisdiction was not
obtained, where the do***ents served on an American defendant who did
not read the German language were in German and the accompanying
correspondence did not identify the do***ents as materials of legal
significance. [FN12] One of the most common arguments for
nonrecognition is a lack of personal jurisdiction. It can be argued
that where jurisdiction is based on the defendant's business contacts
with the jurisdiction, there was no personal jurisdiction where the
dollar amount of such business was small, [FN13] or where there was a
single incident involving a purchase in the foreign country. [FN14] On
the other hand, it can be shown that there was personal jurisdiction
where the contract was entered into in the foreign jurisdiction,
[FN15] where the performance or production under the contract took
place in part or whole in that jurisdiction, [FN16] or where the
defendant had an office in the foreign jurisdiction or resided there
for some or all of the relevant time period. [FN17] Even relatively
short contacts by the defendant's principal or representatives might
be held to be enough to confer personal jurisdiction, especially if
there are additional contacts between the parties such as letters and
telephone calls. [FN18] Where the defendant claimed that there was no
personal jurisdiction, an appearance to contest it may be found to be
a voluntary appearance and thus a submission to the foreign
jurisdiction. [FN19] It can be argued that there was no violation of
due process, for purpose of the Act's nonrecognition provision, where
the foreign country gave the defendant a reasonable time to appear for
the trial. [FN20] The defendant may claim nonrecognition on the basis
of an assertion that at the foreign default proceeding, the plaintiff
presented the case unfairly and fraudulently, such as by quoting
selectively from the defendant's affidavit. However, the plaintiff may
be able to respond that in any event the entire affidavit was
available for the foreign court's perusal so that there was no fraud
involved. [FN21] As a rule, the issue whether a cause of action is
repugnant to the state's system of justice means that the entire type
of cause of action is disfavored, such as the allowance of alimony to
a remarried woman. [FN22] However, it can also mean that the standard
of proof for the cause of action differed significantly between the
foreign country and forum state, [FN23] that the foreign court reached
an unlikely conclusion without adequate explanation, [FN24] or that
its conclusion was based on false representations by the plaintiff.
[FN25] It can be argued to the contrary that a foreign money judgment
was not based on a claim that was repugnant to the state's
jurisprudence where the foreign country and the forum state have
relevant causes of action that are based on almost identical criteria,
[FN26] as relatively minor changes in the laws do not reflect a deep
public policy division. [FN27] It could be shown by the testimony of
lawyers or judges that the action was repugnant since the forum state
has routinely enforced such types of claims. [FN28] In any event, it
should be argued by the plaintiff that the standard for what is
repugnant to public policy is a relatively high one. [FN29]

Where the defendant claims that nonrecognition of a foreign money
judgment is appropriate because the foreign jurisdiction was a
seriously inconvenient forum, it could be argued that all other things
being equal, it was a serious inconvenience for the institutional
plaintiff to require an individual defendant to appear in a foreign
court rather than an American court, especially where the plaintiff
had contacts in the forum state or had directly litigated related
issues in the forum's courts. [FN30] On the other hand, it can be
argued that in many instances of international finance and dealings,
the foreign jurisdiction may in fact have the most contacts with the
deal than any other jurisdiction and thus it cannot be said to be
inconvenient. [FN31]

II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

=A7 3. Validity in view of absence of requirement of notice and hearing

It has been held that although the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act, which made foreign country money judgments
enforceable in the same manner as judgments of sister states, did not
contain express provisions as to notice to the defendant of the
recognition proceedings, a judgment creditor's common-law suit brought
to recognize a Canadian judgment complied with due process
requirements of notice and hearing.

Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act supplies a statutory
basis for enforcing foreign judgments, and represents an im****tant
progressive step in the recognition and enforcement of money judgments
of the courts of other nations. N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16 to 2A:49A-24. Kam-
Tech Systems Ltd. v. Yardeni, 340 N.J. Super. 414, 774 A.2d 644 (App.
Div. 2001).

While recognizing that the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act did not contain express provisions as to notice to the defendant
of the recognition proceedings, in Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v.
Patal Enterprises, Ltd., 794 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1990), the court held
that a judgment creditor's common-law suit brought to recognize a
Canadian judgment complied with due process requirements of notice and
hearing. The court explained that the provisions of =A7 3 of the Uniform
Act (Tex. Rev. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. =A7 35.004) allowed
enforcement by two means: an enforcement action under the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act or a common-law suit in which
notice and hearing of defenses to recognition could be asserted. The
court rejected the holdings of intermediate appellate courts, [FN32]
which had reasoned that the Recognition Act violated due process by
its failure to create a procedure through which the judgment debtor
could assert statutory criteria for nonrecognition, while at the same
time providing that the foreign country judgment, once recognized, was
conclusive between the parties to the extent that it granted or denied
recovery of a sum of money.

=A7 4. Pre-emption of Act by federal law

There is judicial authority for the view that the Uniform Act was not
preempted by federal law implementing the Convention on Recognition
and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards.

In Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d
1313 (2d Cir. 1973) (applying New York law), the court rejected an
argument that the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act was
pre-empted by the overriding federal law implementing the Convention
on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (9 U.S.C.A. =A7=A7 201
et seq.). The court held that such statutes do not pre-empt New York
state law to the extent that it permits, regulates, and establishes a
procedure for the enforcement of foreign money judgments, since the
Convention on Recognition itself and its enforcing legislation go only
to the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award and not to the
enforcement of foreign judgments confirming foreign arbitral awards.

III. DEFINITIONS AND APPLICABILITY

A. "Foreign State"

=A7 5. As precluding sister state judgments

The courts in the following cases held or recognized that the
definition, contained in =A7 1(1) of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act, of a "foreign state" as any governmental unit other
than the United States, or any state, district, commonwealth,
territory, insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the Ryukyu Islands,
precluded any application of the Act to the judgments of sister
states. [FN33]

Conn--Hilton Intern. of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Pacific, 1992 WL 66559
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1992) (by implication) (unre****ted); Compass Bank
for Savings v. Katz, 1997 WL 139398 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997) (by
implication) (unre****ted) [FN34].

Ga--Kronitz v. Fifth Ave. Dance Studio, Inc., 242 Ga. 398, 249 S.E.2d
80 (1978).

Idaho--G & R Petroleum, Inc. v. Clements, 127 Idaho 119, 898 P.2d 50
(1995).

Ill--Van Kooten Holding B.V. v. Dumarco Corp., 670 F. Supp. 227 (N.D.
Ill. 1987) [FN35]; Act Metal Fabricating Co. v. Arvid C. Walberg &
Co., 135 Ill. App. 3d 452, 90 Ill. Dec. 266, 481 N.E.2d 1066 (2d Dist.
1985).

Md--Mueller v. Payn, 30 Md. App. 377, 352 A.2d 895 (1976).

Mich--Peters Production, Inc. v. Desnick Broadcasting Co., 171 Mich.
App. 283, 429 N.W.2d 654 (1988).

NM--Jordan v. Hall, 115 N.M. 775, 858 P.2d 863 (Ct. App. 1993).

Okla--Willhite v. Willhite, 1976 OK 17, 546 P.2d 612 (Okla. 1976).

Concluding that the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
was inapplicable in an action brought by a New York cor****ation to
recover on an authenticated New York judgment against a Georgia
resident, the court observed in Kronitz v. Fifth Ave. Dance Studio,
Inc., 242 Ga. 398, 249 S.E.2d 80 (1978), that the Act (Ga. Code Ann. =A7
110-1304) expressly applied only to judgments of "foreign" states,
which were defined so as to exclude sister states.

CAUTION:

In Jacoby v. Jacoby, 150 Ga. App. 725, 258 S.E.2d 534 (1979), the
court held that the trial court properly held that an action to
enforce a judgment rendered in California was not barred by the
Georgia Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act (Ga. Code Ann. =A7
110-1301(b)), where the Act expressly had no application to a foreign
judgment for sup****t in matrimonial or family matters, but where the
court did not rule that the Act did not apply to sister state
proceedings.

In rejecting a judgment debtor's contention that a Missouri judgment
should not be recognized, under =A7 4(b)(6) of the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act (Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. =A7
10-701(c), because the "foreign court" was a seriously inconvenient
forum, the court in Mueller v. Payn, 30 Md. App. 377, 352 A.2d 895
(1976), held that the Act had no bearing whatsoever, since the Act, by
its definition of "foreign state" in =A7 1(1), applies only to the
judgments of countries outside the United States, its territories, and
its possessions.

In rejecting a divorced husband's contention that an Oklahoma trial
court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of a Texas divorce
decree because =A7 1(2) of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, =A7 710 (1971)), which
defines the term "foreign judgment," specifically precludes
recognition of a judgment for sup****t in matrimonial or family
affairs, the court in Willhite v. Willhite, 1976 OK 17, 546 P.2d 612
(Okla. 1976), held that the Act applies only to judgments of a
"foreign state" as defined in =A7 1(1) of the Act, and that this
definition does not include the judgments of sister states. The Texas
judgment had been recorded pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act, which the court noted was an act pertaining to
judgments of sister states.

NOTE:

The courts in Ross v. Brewer, 1991 OK CIV APP 6, 805 P.2d 133 (Okla.
Ct. App. Div. 3 1991) (by implication), and In re Marriage of Grant,
1998 OK CIV APP 127, 964 P.2d 963 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 1 1998), have
apparently implicitly allowed the recognition of sister state
judgments under the Act.

=A7 6. --As not precluding sister state judgments

The courts in the following cases, often without expressly discussing
the issue of whether the definition, contained in =A7 1(1) of the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, of a "foreign state"
as any governmental unit other than the United States, or any state,
district, commonwealth, territory, insular possession thereof, or the
Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the
Ryukyu Islands, precluded any application of the Act to judgments of
sister states, held or apparently assumed that the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act was applicable in actions involving
judgments of sister states.

Cal--Stevens v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 3d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 369
(2d Dist. 1972).

Conn--Bank of New York v. Cocozza, 1991 WL 225148 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1991) (by implication); Brannick v. Genova, 1991 WL 28035 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1991) (by implication); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Nielson,
1991 WL 85151 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991).

Ga--Jacoby v. Jacoby, 150 Ga. App. 725, 258 S.E.2d 534 (1979).

Ill--Salisbury Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Carpenter, 131 Ill. App. 3d
829, 86 Ill. Dec. 839, 476 N.E.2d 15 (5th Dist. 1985).

Kan--Elkhart Co-op. Equity Exchange v. Hicks, 16 Kan. App. 2d 336, 823
P.2d 223 (1991) (by implication).

Mass--Titan PRT Systems, Inc. v. Fabian, 6 Mass. L. Rptr. 345, 1997 WL
27120 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1997) (by implication).

Okla--Ross v. Brewer, 1991 OK CIV APP 6, 805 P.2d 133 (Okla. Ct. App.
Div. 3 1991) (by implication); In re Marriage of Grant, 1998 OK CIV
APP 127, 964 P.2d 963 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 1 1998) (apparently
implicitly allowing the recognition of sister state judgments under
the Act).

In Stevens v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 3d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 369
(2d Dist. 1972), the facts of which are more fully discussed in =A7 25,
the court appeared to construe =A7 6 of the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act as authorizing a postjudgment stay of
execution even though the money judgment involved was obtained in
Oklahoma rather than in a "foreign state" as defined by =A7 1(1) of the
Act.

In the unre****ted case of Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Nielson, 1991 WL
85151 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991), involving an attempted enforcement in
Connecticut of a money judgment rendered in the state of New York, the
court held that the judgment was subject to recognition under the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act as being a judgment of
a "foreign state" under Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. =A7 50a-31(1). [FN36]

Attention is directed to Jacoby v. Jacoby, 150 Ga. App. 725, 258 S.E.
2d 534 (1979), in which the court held that the trial court properly
held that an action to enforce a judgment rendered in California was
not barred by the Georgia Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act (Ga.
Code Ann. =A7 110-1301(b)) where the Act expressly had no application to
a foreign judgment for sup****t in matrimonial or family matters, but
where the court did not rule that the Act did not apply to sister
state proceedings.

CAUTION:

The court observed in Kronitz v. Fifth Ave. Dance Studio, Inc., 242
Ga. 398, 249 S.E.2d 80 (1978), that the Act (Ga. Code Ann. =A7 110-1304)
expressly applied only to judgments of "foreign" states, which were
defined so as to exclude sister states, and concluded that the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act was inapplicable in an action
brought by a New York cor****ation to recover on an authenticated New
York judgment against a Georgia resident.

See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Woodstock, Inc., 34 Ill. App. 3d
86, 339 N.E.2d 423 (1st Dist. 1975), =A7 22, in which the court, in
rejecting an argument that a Florida judgment for unpaid telephone
charges should not have been recognized in Illinois because the
Florida court was a seriously inconvenient forum under =A7 4(b)(6) of
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, did not question
the application of the Act to a sister state judgment.

In Salisbury Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Carpenter, 131 Ill. App. 3d
829, 86 Ill. Dec. 839, 476 N.E.2d 15 (5th Dist. 1985), an action
involving a disputed construction contract among a commercial building
owner, a contractor who agreed to install a fire sprinkler system, and
a subcontractor who agreed to provide a fire protection system to
fulfil the contractor's obligation to the owner, the court held that
notice to an Illinois contractor of the Illinois court's action in
granting the subcontractor's motion for a stay of injunction until the
trial was about to begin in Florida was not untimely notice under the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch.
110, par. 12-621(b)(1) (recodified at 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
5/12-621)). The court reasoned that the notice mentioned in the
statute referred to the notice required by Florida, the jurisdiction
that rendered judgment, and not notice of the ruling by the Illinois
appellate court on motion. The court added that the fact remained that
the contractor was aware that suit against it was pending in Florida,
and that the contractor had retained Florida counsel and had
participated in pretrial proceedings.

CAUTION:

See Act Metal Fabricating Co. v. Arvid C. Walberg & Co., 135 Ill. App.
3d 452, 90 Ill. Dec. 266, 481 N.E.2d 1066 (2d Dist. 1985), in which
the court held that sister state judgements were not under the Act,
and see also Van Kooten Holding B.V. v. Dumarco Corp., 670 F. Supp.
227 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (applying Illinois law), in which the court
recognized that the few Illinois cases that seem to apply the Act to
sister state judgments were not good precedent.

=A7 7. Reciprocity requirement [FN37]

Under a special state definition of the term "foreign state" in the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act providing that a
foreign country was required to have entered into a reciprocal
agreement with the United States to come within the Act, it has been
held that since Belgium did not have such an agreement with the United
States, the court was not required to recognize a Belgian money
judgment under the Act.

See Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 612 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying
California law), recognizing that there was no reciprocity requirement
under the California version of the Uniform Act.

Explaining that under the special Colorado definition of the term
"foreign state" in the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
(Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. =A7 13-62-102(1)), a foreign country was required
to have entered into a reciprocal agreement with the United States to
come within the Act, the court in Milhoux v. Linder, 902 P.2d 856
(Colo. Ct. App. 1995), as modified on denial of reh'g, (Mar. 30,
1995), held that the district court was not required to recognize a
Belgian judgment under the Act, since Belgium did not have such an
agreement with the United States. The court reasoned that even though
the United States had not entered into any formal reciprocal
agreements with any country, this did not render the Act meaningless,
but simply meant that the Act could not work until the reciprocal
agreement was adopted. The court added that the passage of the Act
with the clause was designed to encourage such reciprocal agreements.
The court further noted that another country's not being encompassed
by the Act did not preclude the recognition of the judgment from that
country under some other legal principle, such as comity.

See Day v. State Dept. of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Child
Sup****t Enforcement Div., 272 Mont. 170, 900 P.2d 296 (1995), in which
the court ruled that the state version of the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act (Mont. Code Ann. =A7 25-9-602(1, 2)) did not
apply to a child sup****t order issued by an tribal court since, as
tribes were deemed to be "States" under the federal Full Faith and
Credit for Child Sup****t Orders Act (28 U.S.C.A. =A7 1738B(b)), they
were excepted from the definition of "foreign states" under the
Recognition Act, and since this Act did not apply to matrimonial
orders. The court went on to state that the court was not deciding
whether the Recognition Act was applicable to Indian Tribal Court
orders, judgments, and decrees that did not involve child sup****t.

B. "Foreign Judgment"

=A7 8. Particular foreign actions as constituting "judgment"

Construing the definition of "final judgment" in the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which included any judgment of a
foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other
than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for
sup****t in matrimonial or family matters, the courts in the following
cases held that particular foreign court actions constituted
"judgments" that could be recognized under the Act. [FN38]

In J. G. Mailaender Druckmaschinenfabrik GmbH & Co. K. G. v. Otto
Isenschmid Corp., 88 A.D.2d 654, 450 N.Y.S.2d 533 (2d Dep't 1982), the
court held that a judicial settlement concluded in a German court was
the equivalent of a consent judgment that would constitute a "foreign
country judgment" for purposes of the Uniform Act (N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301,
5303), enforceable by a motion for summary judgment in lieu of a
complaint.

In Seetrans****t Wiking Trader Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co.,
Kommanditgesellschaft v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 29 F.3d 79 (2d Cir.
1994) (applying New York law), the court held that a rejection by a
Paris Court of Appeals of an application to annul an arbitration
award, thus conferring exequatur on the award, rendered the award the
functional equivalent of a "judgment," so it was subject to
recognition under the Uniform Act (N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5302). The court
explained that, while exequatur seemed to presuppose the existence of
a judgment, New York, being relatively generous in recognizing foreign
judgments, would recognize an arbitration award with exequatur as a
judgment.

=A7 9. "Sum of money"

[a] Judgment held within definition of term

It has been held that where a number of insurers brought an action in
a British court for a declaration that they were not liable to a
cor****ation on certain insurance policies, a judgment in this matter
by the English court would be a "foreign judgment" under the Uniform
Act's definition of it as any judgment of a foreign State granting or
denying recovery of a "sum of money."

Where a number of insurers brought an action in a British court for a
declaration that they were not liable to a cor****ation on certain
insurance policies, in Philips Electronics, N.V. v. New Hamp****re Ins.
Co., 295 Ill. App. 3d 895, 230 Ill. Dec. 102, 692 N.E.2d 1268 (1st
Dist. 1998), reh'g denied, (Apr. 29, 1998), the court held that a
judgment in this matter by the English court would be a "foreign
judgment" under the Uniform Act's definition of it as "any judgment of
a foreign State granting or denying recovery of a sum of money," 735
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-618(b) (1994). The court reasoned that the
insurers were seeking to prevent the plaintiffs from recovering a sum
of money, namely the proceeds of the fidelity policies, and that if
they succeeded the judgment would deny them such a recovery. The court
added that where the language of a statute is certain and unambiguous
the courts must enforce the laws as enacted by the legislature. In any
event, the court concluded, even if the Act did not apply to a
judgment entered by the English court, in the instant case the Act's
savings provision would allow recognition of the decree under
principles of comity.

[b] Judgment held not within definition of term

Under the particular cir***stances of the following cases, the courts
held that foreign country judgments were not enforceable in state
courts under the Uniform Act, =A7 1(b), defining an enforceable "foreign
country judgment" as one involving recovery of a "a sum of money,"
where the judgments in question allegedly merely performed such
actions as nullifying a contract or sequestering assets and did not
actually award money, or where the amount was not specified.

In the unre****ted decision in World Granite and Marble Corp. v. Wil-
Freds Const., Inc., 1996 WL 763230 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (applying Illinois
law), the court held that pursuant to the definition of foreign
judgment under the Uniform Act (735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-618) as
"any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum
of money, other than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or
a judgment for sup****t in matrimonial or family matters," two foreign
judgments were not subject to recognition as they did not involve
recovery of a sum of money. The court noted that the first Italian
judgment merely confirmed, as a precautionary measure, the
conservatory arrest sequestration of the defendant's bank guarantee
pending final resolution of any and all liability issues in Illinois
litigation. The other order similarly did not grant or deny the
plaintiff a sum of money, the court added, as it merely ordered
transfer of title of the guarantee to the plaintiff in satisfaction of
a grant of money to the plaintiff in a third order.

In Farrow Mortg. Services Pty. Ltd. v. Singh, 3 Mass. L. Rptr. 552,
1995 WL 809561 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1995), judgment summarily aff'd, 42
Mass. App. Ct. 1103, 675 N.E.2d 445 (1997), in which the plaintiff
sought recognition and enforcement under the Uniform Act (Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 235, =A7 23A) of a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court
of New South Wales, Australia, in an action arising from a default on
a loan to a cor****ation that was personally guaranteed by the
defendant, the court said that, as the Act permits recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments "to the extent that it grants ... a
sum of money" and a foreign judgment for an undetermined amount of
money is not enforceable under the Act, while the amount due on the
defaulted loan, which had been determined by the Australian court,
could be recognized and enforced according to the plain language of
the statute, because the Australian court had not determined the
actual dollar figure of costs owed the plaintiff, its award of costs
to plaintiff could not be recognized and enforced in Massachusetts.

In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 962 F.
Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying New York law), the court held that
a Romanian judgment was not enforceable in New York under the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301(b),
defining an enforceable "foreign country judgment" as one involving "a
sum of money," where the judgment in question allegedly merely
nullified a contract and did not award money.

=A7 10. "Fine or penalty"

Construing the definition of "final judgment" in the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which includes any judgment of a
foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other
than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, the courts in the
cir***stances of the following cases ruled that since particular
foreign judgments were remedial in nature and not punitive they were
not within the exclusion of being a fine or penalty and thus were
subject to recognition under the Act.

In Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Hoffman, 665 F. Supp. 73 (D. Mass.
1987) (applying Massachusetts law), the court held that a Belgian
money judgment did not constitute a "fine or other penalty" so as to
be necessarily unenforceable as not being a "final judgment" under the
Uniform Act (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 235, =A7 23A), although the
proceeding that formed the basis of the suit was primarily criminal.
The case involved accusations of financial irregularities and criminal
bankruptcy, and the verdict also included a suspended one-year prison
sentence and a fine. The court explained that the question whether a
judgment was "a fine or other penalty" depended on whether its purpose
was remedial in nature, affording a private remedy to an injured
person, or penal in nature, puni****ng an offense against the public
justice, and commented that this distinction was consistent with the
common-law principle that the courts of no country execute the penal
laws of another. The court pointed out that the Belgian court
considered the damage petition as a civil remedy, that the judgment
did not afford punishment for an offense against the public justice of
Belgium, and that the benefit of the judgment accrued to a private
judgment creditor, not to Belgium.

Construing the definition of "final judgment" in the Uniform Act
(Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 235, =A7 23A) that excludes a judgment for a
fine or other penalty, in Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewell, 411 Mass.
711, 585 N.E.2d 321 (1992), involving an attempted enforcement in
Massachusetts of Canadian judgments awarding costs to a law firm, the
court ruled that such judgments were not within the exclusion and were
enforceable final judgments. The court explained that in Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Hoffman, 665 F. Supp. 73 (D. Mass. 1987), this
section, it was held that the question whether a judgment is "a fine
or other penalty" depended on whether its purpose was remedial in
nature, affording a private remedy to an injured person, or penal in
nature, puni****ng an offense against the public justice, and commented
that this distinction was consistent with the common-law principle
that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another. The
court concluded that the judgments were remedial and not a penalty
under Canadian law, in that Canadian legal authority cited in the
firm's affidavit sup****ted a finding that the sole purpose of the
costs *****sed the unsuccessful plaintiff was to compensate his
adversary for the damage inflicted on him in compelling him to incur
expenses in sup****t of a just claim. The plaintiff argued that the
question was governed not by Canadian law but by Massachusetts law,
and that because the award of costs was based on a percentage of the
amount in issue and had little to do with the actual costs incurred by
the defendant in its intervention,the judgments, under Massachusetts
law, were penal rather than remedial. The court responded, however,
that there was no difference between the Canadian judgment and
Massachusetts contingency fee agreements, which were recognized as
valid measures of legal services rendered.

=A7 11. "Matrimonial or family matters"

The courts held in the following cases that pursuant to =A7 1(2) of the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which excludes a
judgment for sup****t in matrimonial or family matters from the
definition of the term "foreign judgment," certain foreign decrees
were unenforceable under the Act, as they involved matrimonial
decrees.

In Jacoby v. Jacoby, 150 Ga. App. 725, 258 S.E.2d 534 (1979), the
court held that the trial court properly held that an action to
enforce a judgment rendered in California was not barred by the fact
that certain aspects of the action made the judgment unenforceable
under the Georgia Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act (Ga. Code
Ann. =A7 110-1301(b)) where the Act expressly had no application to a
foreign judgment for sup****t in matrimonial or family matters, so that
the enforcement suit, having no relevance to the Act, could proceed on
simple full faith and credit grounds as between states of the Union.

In Knothe v. Rose, 195 Ga. App. 7, 392 S.E.2d 570 (1990), the court
held that the Georgia Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act (Ga. Code
Ann. =A7 110-1301(b)) was inapplicable to a judgment for child sup****t,
although the court had the power to recognize and enforce the judgment
under the principle of comity.

Referring to the definition of "foreign judgment" in =A7 1(2) of the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, the court in Nardi v.
Segal, 90 Ill. App. 2d 432, 234 N.E.2d 805 (2d Dist. 1967), held that
a foreign child sup****t claim was excluded because the Act
specifically excludes enforcement of a foreign country's judgment for
sup****t in matrimonial or family matters. The trial court had
determined that the court lacked jurisdiction to require payment of an
arrearage of child sup****t to a divorced wife based on an Israeli
divorce decree. The appellate court stated that matrimonial matters
are governed solely by statute, and that by adopting the Act, which
governs the enforcement of a foreign country's judgment or decree, the
legislature had pre-empted the divorced wife's theory that she was
suing in an action of debt and not on a foreign judgment based on a
divorce in chancery. The court thus affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the action to enforce the Israeli judgment for child
sup****t.

In Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill. App. 3d 849, 4 Ill. Dec. 450, 360
N.E.2d 386 (1st Dist. 1977), the court referred to the definition of
"foreign judgment" in =A7 1(2) of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 77, =A7 121, recodified at 735 Ill.
Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-618 et seq.), and held that the Act provided no
basis for jurisdiction over an action seeking to modify an earlier
order of child sup****t that was based on a Cuban divorce decree.

In Jeong Suk Bang v. Joon Hong Park, 116 Mich. App. 34, 321 N.W.2d 831
(1982), the court held that a Korean divorce decree that required the
husband to pay his former wife the sum of $50,000 over a period of
time, part of which was for solatium, was not enforceable under the
Uniform Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. =A7
691.1151(b)), where the Act excluded foreign judgments for sup****t in
matrimonial or family matters. The trial court found that solatium was
a compensation for wounded feelings and the loss of comfort and social
pleasure between members of a family, so it was an excluded
matrimonial or family matter. The plaintiff argued that solatium was
not a judgment for sup****t but was a type of damages, but the court
responded that the solatium provisions of the Korean decree were so
intermixed with the sup****t and matrimonial provisions that the Act
would not apply. The case was remanded for consideration of
enforceability under principles of comity.

In Mandel-Mantello v. Treves, 103 Misc. 2d 700, 426 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup
1980), rev'd, 79 A.D.2d 569, 434 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1st Dep't 1980), the
court held that a Swiss divorce decree child sup****t provision was not
within the scope of the Uniform Act (N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5303), since it
involved matrimonial issues.

CAUTION:

On appeal, the decision of Mandel-Mantello v. Treves, 103 Misc. 2d
700, 426 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup 1980), was reversed in Mandel-Mantello v.
Treves, 79 A.D.2d 569, 434 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1st Dep't 1980), the court
finding that foreign matrimonial awards are accorded recognition in
New York provided they are final and incapable of being modified by
rendering country, so the Swiss decree, were it to be found final and
nonmodifiable retroactively, could be enforced against the former
spouse's realty interests in New York. The higher court did not refer
to the state Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act.

The court in Rains v. State, Dept. of Social and Health Services, Div.
of Child Sup****t, 98 Wash. App. 127, 989 P.2d 558 (Div. 3 1999),
review denied, 141 Wash. 2d 1013, 10 P.3d 1071 (2000), noted in
passing that the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
(Wash. Rev. Code Ann. =A7 6.40.010(2)) does not apply to sup****t orders.
The court continued on to enforce an Italian sup****t order as a matter
of comity.

=A7 12. As precluding sister state judgments

There is authority for the proposition that application of the Uniform
Act to "foreign" judgments is limited to judgments obtained in the
courts of foreign countries, not those obtained in other states.
[FN39]

Although reasoning that "foreign judgment" is a term of art that
commonly refers to the judgments of neighboring states, in Eagle
Leasing v. Amandus, 476 N.W.2d 35 (Iowa 1991), the court held that
under the state Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, Iowa
Code Ann. ch. 626B, application of the statute to "foreign" judgments
is limited to judgments obtained in the courts of foreign countries,
not those obtained in other states.

C. "Final and Conclusive" Judgment

=A7 13. In general

[a] Judgment final and conclusive

Under the particular cir***stances of the following cases the courts
held that a foreign judgment entered on a foreign award was "final and
conclusive" under =A7 2 of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act, despite such factors as the judgment being subject to
change. [FN40]

A money judgment against stock seller/buyer, for Alberta Securities
Commission's investigation expenses, entered in Court of Queen's Bench
of Province of Alberta, Canada, was a "final judgment," within meaning
of general presumption in favor of recognizing, in Arizona courts, a
final judgment of a court of a foreign state granting or denying
recovery of sum of money, though seller/buyer had appealed from
Commission's underlying administrative ruling, where he had later
dismissed his appeal and had not commenced collateral attack on the
judgment in Alberta. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law =A7
481(1). Alberta Securities Com'n v. Ryckman, 30 P.3d 121 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Div. 1 2001).

Construing the Uniform Act requirement that a judgment be a "final and
conclusive" judgment (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 235, =A7 23A), in
Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewell, 411 Mass. 711, 585 N.E.2d 321
(1992), involving an attempted enforcement in Massachusetts of
Canadian judgments awarding costs to a law firm, the court held that
the judgment was final even though the main litigation among the
parties was ongoing. The court reasoned that the lower court judge
correctly held that the intervention action by the law firm's client
had reached final and conclusive judgment. The court noted that under
Quebec law aggressive intervention constituted a separate suit, even
when joined to the original action, and that the client was an
aggressive intervenor in the original proceedings. The court added
that the client had no further connection to the ongoing litigation
and that those proceedings would have no effect on the instant
judgment..

In Dart v. Dart, 224 Mich. App. 146, 568 N.W.2d 353 (1997), appeal
granted, 459 Mich. 880, 586 N.W.2d 744 (1998) and aff'd on other
grounds, 460 Mich. 573, 597 N.W.2d 82 (1999), reh'g denied, 602 N.W.2d
576 (Mich. 1999) and cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1418, 146 L. Ed. 2d 311
(U.S. 2000), the court held that an English judgment of divorce, which
awarded the wife a lump sum, child sup****t, and certain property, was
enforceable against the wife in Michigan under the state Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. =A7=A7
691.1151, 691.1153, as the judgment was "final" even though under
English law all orders in matrimonial actions concerning finances are
interlocutory. The court noted that the Act provided that it was
applicable to a judgment despite the fact that there was an appeal
pending or the judgment was subject to appeal. Furthermore, the court
pointed out that under English law a judgment that determined an issue
was final even if it is subject to appeal.

Generally, if a foreign country money judgment meets the conditions of
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (UFMJRA), then the
judgment is conclusive and entitled to recognition as a matter of
international comity. M.C.L.A. =A7=A7 691.1151 et seq. Electrolines, Inc.
v. Prudential Assurance Company, Ltd., 260 Mich. App. 144, 677 N.W.2d
874 (2003).

State courts must recognize a final foreign country judgment for money
damages as conclusive between the parties, unless the judgment debtor
establishes one of the specific grounds for non-recognition that are
enumerated in the Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act.
N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-19, 2A:49A-20. Kam-Tech Systems Ltd. v. Yardeni, 340
N.J. Super. 414, 774 A.2d 644 (App. Div. 2001).

Despite an American defendant's contention that a Curacao judgment
entered on an arbitration award was not conclusive or final since the
award left it open to either party to demand further arbitration and
possibly to obtain further and more extensive damages, the court in
Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313
(2d Cir. 1973) (applying New York law), held that the judgment was
final and conclusive under =A7 2 of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act. The court noted that the potential for appellate
review of the award in the courts of Curacao ceased when the defendant
failed to seek such review within three months of the award. The court
also pointed out that the judgment itself was definite in amount, was
conclusive and enforceable in Curacao, and was final to the extent
that it specified precisely what the defendant was to pay.

Where a Romanian cor****ation sued an American cor****ation, seeking to
enforce a Romanian money judgment, the court in S.C. Chimexim S.A. v.
Velco Enterprises Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying
New York law), held that the money judgment was final, for purposes of
the New York statute governing enforcement of foreign country
judgments (N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304), although the judgment was on appeal in
Romania. The court noted that three Romanian lawyers testified that a
judgment was a final under Romanian law despite an appeal, and the New
York statute governing foreign country judgments provided that it was
applicable even though there was an appeal pending (N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5302).

Under New York law, foreign-country judgment that is final, conclusive
and enforceable where rendered must be recognized and is enforced as
conclusive between parties to extent that it grants or denies recovery
of sum of money. N.Y. McKinney's CPLR 5301 et seq., 6201(4). Ocean
Warehousing B.V. v. Baron Metals and Alloys, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 245
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).

Evidence sup****ted finding that Hong Kong judgment was a final
judgment, for purposes of Foreign Country Recognition Act; judgment
debtor failed to present evidence that the judgment was not facially
final, according to Hong Kong law, other than judgment's lack of
registrar's signature. V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code =A7=A7
36.002, 36.004, 36.0041. Hernandez v. Seventh Day Adventist Corp.,
Ltd., 54 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2001).

[b] Judgment not final and conclusive

It has been held under certain cir***stances that a money judgment
obtained in a foreign court was not enforceable under the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act where the judgment, although
enforceable in the country where rendered, was not "final" but
"preliminary" under the law of that country.

Provisionally enforceable Korean money judgment against alleged
tortfeasor was not "conclusive" within meaning of California statute
governing recognition of foreign judgments, and thus Korean
cor****ation was not entitled to recognition of such judgment, where
Korean Supreme Court had issued ruling removing the legal underpinning
sup****ting judgment and remanding case for retrial de novo, such that
judgment was no longer based on calculated damages amount. West's Ann.
Cal.C.C.P. =A7 1713.2; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws =A7 108.
Korea Water Resources Corp. v. Lee, 115 Cal. App. 4th 389, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 853 (4th Dist. 2004).

In Mayekawa Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Sasaki, 76 Wash. App. 791, 888 P.2d 183
(Div. 1 1995), the court held that a judgment obtained against a
Japanese cor****ation in Japan was not enforceable under the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Wash. Rev. Code Ann. =A7
6.40.070) where the judgment, although enforceable in Japan, was not
"final" but "preliminary" under Japanese law because an objection to
it had been filed. The court distinguished Island Territory of Curacao
v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973) (applying New
York law), =A7 13[a], as in Curacao an arbitration judgment was final
and conclusive where neither party availed itself of a three-month
op****tunity to seek review of the award before it became final, while
in the instant case the cor****ation challenged the preliminary
enforcement of the judgment by filing an objection. The court added
that its ruling did not bar the plaintiff from again applying for
recognition when the judgment became final at the completion of the
litigation.

=A7 14. Special requirement of enforceability

[a] Stale judgments revived by foreign court order

Under a state version of the Act requiring a foreign judgment to be
"final, conclusive and enforceable" to be recognized, it has been held
that money judgments based on guarantee agreements would be recognized
as being "enforceable" in the country where rendered pursuant to a
special court order of that country's highest court, even though the
judgments were ordinarily stale as rendered a long time in the past.

Explaining that for a foreign country judgment to be recognized under
New York's enactment of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Act (N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5304) the judgment must be "final, conclusive and
enforceable," in Overseas Development Bank In Liquidation v. Nothmann,
115 A.D.2d 719, 496 N.Y.S.2d 534 (2d Dep't 1985), the court held that
two English default money judgments based on guarantee agreements
would be recognized as being "enforceable" in England pursuant to a
special English court order of the High Court of Justice, Queen's
Bench Division, although the judgments were ordinarily stale since
seven years had passed before the New York proceeding was brought. The
court added that none of the mandatory or discretionary grounds for
denying recognition to the judgments remained applicable.

OBSERVATION:

Some of the facts of Nothmann are taken from the previous Appellate
Division decision at Overseas Development Bank in Liquidation v.
Nothmann, 103 A.D.2d 534, 480 N.Y.S.2d 735 (2d Dep't 1984), order
rev'd, 64 N.Y.2d 927, 488 N.Y.S.2d 632, 477 N.E.2d 1086 (1985). It had
been held in the earlier appeal that the judgments would not be
recognized under English law since after six years had passed
enforcement could be made only through a writ of execution, and there
was no proof that such a writ had or would be issued, but the order
was reversed in the court of appeals based on the plaintiffs'
obtaining a writ of execution.

[b] Invalid process

It has been held, where a judgment creditor brought suit against the
judgment debtors to domesticate judgments obtained in a foreign court
under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act, that the evidence
raised a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the creditor
effectively served the debtors under either local state or foreign
law, precluding summary judgment because the judgment was not
"enforceable where rendered" as required by the Act.

In K & R Robinson Enterprises Ltd. v. Asian Ex****t Material Supply
Co., Inc., 178 F.R.D. 332 (D. Mass. 1998) (applying Massachusetts
law), where a judgment creditor brought suit against the judgment
debtors to domesticate default judgments obtained in British Columbia
under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 235, =A7 23A), the court held that the evidence raised a genuine
dispute of fact as to whether the creditor effectively served the
debtors under either Massachusetts or British Columbia law, precluding
summary judgment because the judgment was not "enforceable where
rendered" as required by the Act. The court explained that service by
a constable on the debtor company was ineffective under Massachusetts
law because a constable may not make service of process in a case in
which, as here, the damages exceed $2,500. Furthermore, the court
noted that under British Columbia law service of process may not be
made in a contract case on an agent of a principal located outside
British Columbia except by leave of court, and the court ruled that
other service on an agent was ineffective because leave of court was
not obtained to serve the agent. The court rejected a claim that there
was reservice of process at later dates, as this would not validate
the default judgment, which was based on nonappearance after the
earlier pur****ted service, since the service was on one of the
individual debtors and not the company, since the other individual
debtor denied receiving service, and since the service did not contain
the requisite papers. The court also rejected an argument that the
company waived its right to contest service.

IV. GROUNDS FOR NONRECOGNITION

A. Basis for Nonconclusive Status

=A7 15. Lack of impartial tribunals and due process

[a] Inconclusiveness of judgment established or sup****table

Under the particular cir***stances of the following cases, the courts
held that a foreign default judgment was not or might not be
enforceable under =A7 4(a)(1) of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act as the tribunal did not afford the defendant process
com****ting with American due-process requirements.

The court in Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2000)
(applying federal and New York law), affirmed the lower court's
holding that Liberian courts during the period in question did not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process
and therefore upheld the lower court's denial of a Liberian creditor's
motion for summary judgment requesting enforcement of a judgment
rendered by the Supreme Court of Liberia under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(a).
The court found that uncontradicted do***entary evidence describing
the chaos within the Liberian judicial system during the period when
the judgment was obtained, including State Department Country Re****ts,
established that Liberian courts during the period from about 1992 to
1997 did not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with
due process, precluding enforcement of judgment in the United States,
despite affidavits of Liberian attorneys stating that the Liberian
system was modeled after that of the United States, but not discussing
actual practice, and a conclusory affidavit that the system was
structured and administered to afford impartial justice.

In Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying
California law), the court held that a default judgment obtained
before an Iranian tribunal by creditor banks against the sister of the
former Shah of Iran was not enforceable under the state implementation
of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code =A7=A7 1713-1713.8), as the Iranian tribunals did not afford
the sister process com****ting with American due-process requirements.
The court explained that the sister could not appear before the
Iranian courts, could not obtain proper legal representation in Iran,
and could not even obtain local witnesses on her behalf.

See Vrozos v. Sarantopoulos, 195 Ill. App. 3d 610, 142 Ill. Dec. 352,
552 N.E.2d 1093 (1st Dist. 1990), =A7 15[a], involving a suit to recover
on a Canadian money judgment under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, part 12-622 (1985; see 735
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-618 et seq.)), against a debtor who never
personally received notice of the Canadian suit after allegedly
evading service, but whose brother received substitute service
pursuant to court order and engaged counsel to enter an appearance,
allegedly without the debtor's authorization or consent, in which the
court held that the trial court erroneously denied the debtor's
petition to vacate the judgment based on issues of fact concerning
claims of lack of personal jurisdiction, notice, and due process.

In an unre****ted decision denying summary enforcement in Titan PRT
Systems, Inc. v. Fabian, 6 Mass. L. Rptr. 345, 1997 WL 27120 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 1997), the court held that there were questions of fact as
to whether a New Jersey judgment based on a newsletter commentator's
liability for commercial libel of two cor****ations should be
recognized under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
(Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 235, =A7 23A), based on a number of defensive
claims including a contention that questions of fact and law remained
whether the New Jersey damages awards afforded the individual
defendant adequate notice for defense against the *****sments and,
relatedly, whether the proceedings afforded procedural and substantive
due process. The cor****ations acknowledged that although the
commentator had notice of the liability proceeding neither the New
Jersey court nor the plaintiff cor****ations provided him with notice
of the damages hearing because the governing rule of court at that
time did not require it. The court reasoned that arguably that
omission, as a matter of New Jersey law or as a matter of choice on
the part of the trial court and the plaintiffs, could constitute a
failure of "notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to defend"
within the meaning of the Massachusetts statute, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 235, =A7 23A. Moreover, the court determined that as a matter of due
process (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 235, =A7 23A) the defendant could
claim that the New Jersey rule's omission of a required separate
notice for the damages hearing was deficient in the cir***stances of
the case. In particular, the court reasoned, as a matter of due
process, both procedural and substantive as applied to the
cir***stances of the instant case, the trial judge's award of $750,000
in "compensatory damages" without any evidentiary basis or reasoning
visible in the court record presented for enforcement presented a
serious issue for inspection by the court of the enforcement state.

[b] Inconclusiveness of judgment not established

Under the particular cir***stances of the following cases, the courts
rejected claims that a foreign money judgment was rendered not
conclusive in the forum court under =A7 4(a)(1) of the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act because the judgment was rendered
under a system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with the requirements of due process of law.

Default judgment entered by English court requiring American member of
English insurance syndicates to immediately fund reinsurer and to
litigate any claims against overseer of syndicates later was not
unenforceable under Texas Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition
Act on ground that system failed to provide "impartial tribunals or
procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law,"
where member waived his procedural rights by signing general
undertaking with overseer and by failing to avail himself of processes
afforded him in England. V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code =A7
36.005(a)(1). The Society of Lloyds v. Webb, 156 F. Supp. 2d 632 (N.D.
Tex. 2001).

Hearsay allegations of Canadian legal practitioner, that Alberta Court
of Appeal would have been unable or unwilling to afford stock seller/
buyer a fair hearing of his appeal from money judgment, entered in
Court of Queen's Bench of Province of Alberta, Canada, in favor of
Alberta Securities Commission for Commission's investigation expenses,
or that Alberta Court of Appeal could not have provided adequate
relief if it accepted arguments of seller/buyer concerning
cir***stances surrounding Commission's administrative hearing on stock
manipulation allegations, so that an appeal would have been futile,
did not establish that Province of Alberta had failed to afford seller/
buyer with op****tunity for hearing that com****ted with basic due
process principles before court of competent jurisdiction, and thus,
the money judgment was entitled to the general presumption in favor of
recognizing, in Arizona courts, a final judgment of a court of a
foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money.
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law =A7 481(1). Alberta
Securities Com'n v. Ryckman, 30 P.3d 121 (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001).

In Fiske, Emery & Associates v. Ajello, 41 Conn. Supp. 376, 577 A.2d
1139 (Super. Ct. 1989), the court rejected a contention that there was
a defense to recognition of a Quebec judgment based on the Uniform Act
(Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. =A7 52-614(a)(1)) provision allowing
nonrecognition if the judgment was rendered under a system that did
not provide procedures compatible with the requirements of due process
of law. The judgment in question affirmed an arbitration award in
favor of a law firm. The court deemed it clear from the summary of
proceedings before the arbitration committee that the defendants were
represented by counsel in those proceedings and that their counsel
requested postponements on several occasions and notified them as to
the date of the hearing. Pointing out that the nature of the claim to
be decided was clear, the court determined that even if the defendants
were not personally informed as to the date of the continued hearing
by their attorney, the facts in the defendants' affidavits, even
construed most favorably to them, did not sup****t a claim of lack of
due process or a claim that the procedures used by the arbitration
committee of the Quebec bar were materially different from the
arbitration procedures used in Connecticut. The court added that
parties are also bound by the actions taken by their attorney within
the attorney's general authority to represent the client. As to an
additional claim that the plaintiffs waived a requirement on the part
of the defendants that they post security before the arbitration
hearing, the court reasoned that as a matter of law this did not
amount to a denial of due process.

In Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000), reh'g
and reh'g en banc denied, (Dec. 29, 2000) (applying Illinois law), the
court affirmed the lower court's holding that judgments of an English
court were not unenforceable under the Illinois Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act (735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-621)) on the
ground they were "rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of
due process of law," even though the English concept of fair procedure
is not identical to that in the United States. The overseer of English
insurance syndicates sought enforcement of English judgments it had
obtained against American members of the syndicates, but the members
argued that those judgments had denied them due process of law.
Rejecting the members' argument, the court recognized that the
protection of the Act was intended to refer to a concept of fair
procedure simple and basic enough to describe the judicial processes
of civilized nations and is fundamentally fair. The court
distinguished the international concept of due process from the
complex concept that has emerged from American case law.

In Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1992) (applying
Maryland law), involving a cause of action brought in England by a
cor****ation against a former director alleging the breach of fiduciary
duty, the court held that use of an ex parte application for a
tem****ary restraining order by the English High Court did not
automatically result in a violation of due process so as to make the
High Court's judgment unenforceable under the state's enactment of the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act

In Manches & Co. v. Gilbey, 419 Mass. 414, 646 N.E.2d 86 (1995), the
court held that an English default judgment was enforceable in
Massachusetts under the Act against a former client of a London firm
of solicitors, rejecting, as being without proof, a contention that
the English system lacked procedures compatible with the requirements
of due process or that the defendants were denied due process in their
attempt to pursue an appeal from the default judgment.

In Dart v. Dart, 224 Mich. App. 146, 568 N.W.2d 353 (1997), appeal
granted, 459 Mich. 880, 586 N.W.2d 744 (1998) and aff'd on other
grounds, 460 Mich. 573, 597 N.W.2d 82 (1999), reh'g denied, 602 N.W.2d
576 (Mich. 1999) and cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1418, 146 L. Ed. 2d 311
(U.S. 2000), the court held that an English judgment of divorce, which
awarded the plaintiff wife a lump sum, child sup****t, and certain
property, was enforceable against the wife in Michigan under the state
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
=A7=A7 691.1151, 691.1153, despite contentions that English law in this
regard was repugnant to public policy, that the tribunal was not
impartial, and that there was a denial of due process in the English
action. The wife contended that English law treated women as second-
class citizens, that its provisions allowed only limited discovery,
that it failed to take the wife's contribution to the family into
account, and that it failed to try the issue of fault. The court
responded that under the particular cir***stances presented it could
not be argued that the wife was denied due process because she had
been represented by counsel in the divorce proceeding and she had been
given an op****tunity to be heard and she had presented evidence on her
own behalf. As to the question of a cause of action being based on a
repugnant issue, the court determined that the factors considered by
the English court in making the property division were virtually
identical to those considered under Michigan law. While the wife
argued in addition that the English judge was not impartial, the court
opined that there was no evidence indicating judicial bias in the
English court. Moreover, the court observed that even if the issue of
fault had been raised, this would not have benefited the wife, who had
admitted that the breakdown of the marriage was her fault due to her
continuing infidelity. The court added that there was no proof of
prejudice by an unfair tribunal of proceeding.

Judgment debtor failed to establish that judgment entered against him
by Israeli court was rendered under a system which did not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of
due process of law; procedures of the Israeli civil justice system did
not fail to measure up to the Foreign Country Money-Judgments
Recognition Act's due process test for establi****ng whether judgment
was conclusive. N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-20, subd. a(1). Kam-Tech Systems Ltd.
v. Yardeni, 340 N.J. Super. 414, 774 A.2d 644 (App. Div. 2001).

In New Central Jute Mills Co. v. City Trade and Industries, Limited,
65 Misc. 2d 653, 318 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Sup 1971), the court found no
grounds under the Uniform Act for refusing recognition of Indian
judgments confirming Indian arbitration awards entered against an
American purchaser of goods. Pointing out that more than ample notice
had been given to the purchaser at all times, the court held that the
purchaser could not claim, under =A7 4(a)(1) of the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act, that the Indian judgments were not
conclusive because of incompatibility with the court's notions of due
process.

Where a default money judgment on a personal loan guarantee was
entered into in a British action when the defendant businessman
neither instructed nor paid his solicitors and they withdrew from the
action, in Colonial Bank v. Worms, 550 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(applying New York law), the court held that this procedure was not a
basis for nonrecognition of the judgment in New York under the Uniform
Act (N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(a)), which provides that a foreign country
money judgment is not conclusive if it was rendered under a system
that does not provide procedures compatible with the requirements of
due process of law. The court rejected the businessman's argument that
allowing the withdrawal of counsel and the entry of a default for
failure of the businessman to file timely pleadings, without giving
the businessman an op****tunity to obtain new counsel, was a procedure
so unfair to him as to amount to a denial of due process. The court
responded that English procedure com****ts with American standards of
due process, and that a party may not attack an English default
judgment on the ground that he was denied due process where he was
given reasonable notice and op****tunity to present his case in the
English court but failed to do so. The court pointed out that the
businessman consented to litigate any disputes in the English courts,
retained the solicitors, but ignored repeated demands from the
solicitors for payments as well as both a threat to withdraw if they
were not paid and a warning of the dire consequences of failure to
answer before the deadline set by the court. Despite this warning, the
businessman did not remit payment and did not make alternative
arrangements to answer. The court noted that the default came about
not from a denial of due process but from the fault of the businessman
as he chose not to answer despite the op****tunity to do so, and that
he later failed to pursue the proper procedures to attempt to have the
judgment withdrawn or reversed.

Explaining that a foreign judgment is generally deemed "conclusive"
under New York law, and thus subject to recognition, unless the
judgment was rendered under a system that does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due
process of law (N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304), in Dynamic Cassette Intern. Ltd.
v. Mike Lopez & Associates, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 8 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(applying New York law), the court held that enforcement of an English
default judgment under the Uniform Act was proper because it was
rendered under a judicial system that was fair and impartial. The
court noted that the plaintiff specifically alleged that the High
Court of Justice was a fair and impartial tribunal, and that since the
defendant had not responded or challenged this contention it was
deemed to have admitted such allegations. Moreover, the court reasoned
that the procedures followed by the courts of England have
traditionally been viewed as compatible to those of the United States,
and England's tribunals have been recognized as being fair and
impartial.

Money judgment issued by English court against Netherlands
cor****ations that maintained no presence in England and appeared only
for purpose of contesting personal jurisdiction was not rendered under
system which did not provide procedures compatible with requirements
of due process, as ground for mandatory nonrecognition of judgment in
New York, although English court used "Mareva" injunction, which froze
cor****ations' assets during pendency of proceeding and directed
certain discovery, and cor****ations' violation of injunction resulted
in entry of judgment against them. McKinney's CPLR 5304(a), par. 1.
CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp. N.V., 743 N.Y.S.2d 408 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 2002).

Where a Romanian cor****ation sued an American cor****ation, seeking to
enforce a Romanian money judgment, the court in S.C. Chimexim S.A. v.
Velco Enterprises Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying
New York law), held that the court system of Romania provided
litigants with an impartial tribunal and afforded them due process, as
required for recognition of the judgment under New York law (N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5304). The court recognized that the judiciary system
established following the fall of Communism was independent of other
government branches, with at least some tenured judges, and there was
free access to courts, availability of procedural due-process
guarantees, and the right to the assistance of an attorney.

Enforcement under Pennsylvania Uniform Foreign Monetary Judgment
Recognition Act of English judgment enforcing "pay-now-sue-later" and
"conclusive evidence" clauses in reinsurance contract would not amount
to a denial of due process since the English legal system as a whole
did not fail to provide due process rights. U.S.C.A. Const Amend XIV;
42 P.S. =A7 22005. Society of Lloyd's v. Mullin, 96 Fed. Appx. 100 (3d
Cir. 2004) (applying Pennsylvania law).

In Tonga Air Services, Ltd. v. Fowler, 118 Wash. 2d 718, 826 P.2d 204
(1992), the court held that under the particular cir***stances
presented there was no violation of due process in obtaining a Tongan
judgment, so it was not subject to nonrecognition on this ground under
the Uniform Act. The judgment debtor claimed that he was improperly
denied a continuance for new counsel to review the file, that Tongan
laws imposed more onerous standards for the introduction of
do***entary evidence on foreigners than it did on Tongans, that there
was a lack of a verbatim transcript, and that the judgment creditor
was allowed to execute on an eight-year-old judgment. The debtor
alleged that his counsel quit three days before a trial on the issue
of reimbursement, but the court noted that the counsel who ultimately
represented the debtor at this trial was the same person who had
previously represented him in an earlier repossession trial based on
the same clause of the contract between the parties. Moreover, the
court pointed out that the record showed that this counsel had filed
an answer to the complaint seven months before the trial and thus did
not become involved only a few days before the trial. The court
rejected the further allegation that there were more stringent
standards for foreigners because the debtor could not submit into
evidence a box of records and receipts that were not stamped and in
duplicate as required by Tongan law, since similar receipts offered by
the creditor were also not admitted because they were not stamped. As
to the lack of a transcript, the court pointed out that this was the
debtor's fault as he did not appeal and thus did not obtain any
relevant do***ents that were destroyed due to the passage of time. As
to the time elapsed before enforcement, the court said that whether an
American court disagreed with the Tongan court's exercise of its
jurisdiction was not an adequate basis for refusing to recognize the
judgment, especially when a judgment rendered in the state court would
have been enforceable for ten years.

In Bank of Nova Scotia v. Tschabold Equipment Ltd., 51 Wash. App. 749,
754 P.2d 1290 (Div. 1 1988), the court held that nonrecognition of a
drawee Canadian bank's default judgment against the payee Wa****ngton
cor****ation was improper under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act where allegations of lack of due process and action
repugnant to public policy were issues already litigated in the
Canadian court, thus invoking the doctrine of res judicata. The court
noted that at a hearing on a motion to strike the Canadian court had
concluded that the bank had stated a claim against the defendant.

=A7 15.5. Arbitration agreement

The following authority has adjudicated whether an agreement to
arbitrate is a ground for nonrecognition of a judgment under the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act.

Dominican court's "sentence" finding in favor of plaintiffs on breach
of contract claim was not subject to recognition under Florida's
version of the Uniform Out-of-Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act,
since proceeding in the Dominican courts was contrary to the binding
arbitration provision in the parties' agreement. West's F.S.A. =A7
55.605(2)(e). Nicor Intern. Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d
1357, R.I.C.O. Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) =B6 10593 (S.D. Fla. 2003).

Foreign country judgment in breach-of-contract action was not entitled
to recognition and enforcement in state under the Uniform Foreign
Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act (UFCMJRA), where the parties to
the contract agreed to arbitrate any disputes arising under the
contract. V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code =A7 36.005(b)(5). The
Courage Co., L.L.C. v. The Chemshare Corp., 93 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App.
Houston 14th Dist. 2002), reh'g overruled, (Nov. 27, 2002).

=A7 16. Lack of personal jurisdiction

[a] Inconclusiveness of judgment established or sup****table

Under the particular cir***stances of the following cases, the courts
held that a foreign court lacked or might have lacked personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, with the result that the foreign
court's money judgment was rendered not conclusive in the forum court
under =A7 4(a)(2) and related provisions of the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act. [FN41]

Where the do***ents served on an American defendant who did not read
the German language were in German and the accompanying correspondence
did not identify the do***ents as materials of legal significance, the
court in Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796 (2d
Dist. 1972), held, pursuant to =A7 4(a)(2) of the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act, providing that a foreign judgment is not
conclusive if the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, that the defendant was not given sufficient notice
of the pending Swiss action in connection with the sale of goods, and
that consequently, the Swiss court never acquired the basis on which
to adjudicate the claim of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
While recognizing that service of process by mail in a foreign country
is no longer automatically objectionable and in appropriate instances
may result in the acquisition by a foreign court of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant, the court stated that at a minimum
defendants should be informed in the language of the jurisdiction in
which they are served that a legal action of a specific nature is
pending against them at a particular time and place, and that normally
such information should include the location of the pending action,
the amount involved, the date the defendant is required to respond,
and the possible consequences of a failure to respond.

In Vrozos v. Sarantopoulos, 195 Ill. App. 3d 610, 142 Ill. Dec. 352,
552 N.E.2d 1093 (1st Dist. 1990), a suit to recover on a Canadian
money judgment under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, par. 12-622 (1985; recodified at 735
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12- 618 et seq.)), against a debtor who never
personally received notice of the Canadian suit after allegedly
evading service, but whose brother received substitute serv